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The Power'S Mechanism Of A Monopoly In A Market Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Antoniu Predescu
  • Iuliana Predescu
  • Stela Aurelia Toader
  • Mihai Aristotel Ungureanu

Abstract

Monopolies make their presence felt in a market economy, not necessarily through 100% ownership control of a market, nor less, because there is a law that sanction its existence; in most cases, the existence of a monopoly and hence its corollary, i.e. monopoly power, has as the primary cause the presence of market imperfections, that is if those are present on the long term, become state of fact. Thus, in our approach, we consider that to bet appropriate to release the mechanism of a monopoly, based on a mathematical tool, which begins from the immutable economic concepts of monopoly.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoniu Predescu & Iuliana Predescu & Stela Aurelia Toader & Mihai Aristotel Ungureanu, 2009. "The Power'S Mechanism Of A Monopoly In A Market Economy," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 2(11), pages 1-13.
    • Handle: RePEc:alu:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:11:p:13
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmalensee, Richard, 1981. "Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 242-247, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    monopoly; monopolist; elasticity; demand;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly

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