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Tax reforms and elections in modern Russia

Author

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  • Igor A. Mayburov
  • Anna P. Kireenko

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of the tax reforms in modern Russia. Tax reforms carried out since the beginning of the 1990s are analyzed in connection with the cyclical repetition of the stages of the electoral process, or the so-called electoral cycle. The research methodology includes the calculation of indicators characterizing the change in the tax system and the analysis of their dynamics at various stages of the electoral cycle. The main quantitative and qualitative indicators are: the tax burden on the economy as a whole (nominal and real); the tax burden on individual elements of GDP (on wages, on gross profit, on actual final consumption); the number of changes made to tax legislation; terms and procedure of tax amnesty. Three stages of tax reforms have been identified (1993–1996, 1997–2000, 2001–present) for research in modern history of Russia. The first two stages of tax reforms directly coincided with the electoral cycles. The third modern stage of tax reforms is implemented during several electoral cycles. The revealed influence of elections on the tax system of Russia results in a cyclical increase of the tax burden on the main elements of GDP in the first years of cycles and lowering of the tax burden in the final years of electoral cycles. In the elective period for elections to the State Duma, the nominal tax burden on the economy is always reduced. In the election year and next year of the electoral cycle, there is an increase in effective rates for profit, consumption and labor. In the final years of the electoral cycle, there is a decrease in effective rates for profit, consumption and labor. Thus, the results of the study confirmed the assumption on the existence of a relationship between tax reforms and elections in Russia and the possibility of increasing the tax burden in the short term

Suggested Citation

  • Igor A. Mayburov & Anna P. Kireenko, 2018. "Tax reforms and elections in modern Russia," Journal of Tax Reform, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, vol. 4(1), pages 73-94.
  • Handle: RePEc:aiy:jnljtr:v:4:y:2018:i:1:p:73-94
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/jtr.2018.4.1.046
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    References listed on IDEAS

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