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Pacta Sunt Servanda Versus the Social Role of Contracts: the case of Brazilian agriculture contracts

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  • Rezende, Christiane Leles
  • Zylbersztajn, Decio

Abstract

Este estudo explora a instabilidade criada por decisões jurídicas contraditórias relacionadas às quebras contratuais. O mercado a termo representa uma importante fonte de recursos para o financiamento da agricultura Brasileira, no entanto, durante um período de aumento de preços da saca de soja no mercado spot, aconteceram muitas quebras contratuais. Foram realizadas análises descritiva e econométrica utilizando 161 decisões judiciais de segunda instância (Apelações) e foi realisada uma pesquisa quantitativa com 70 produtores de soja. Os resultados mostraram larga dispersão entre as decisões dos juízes, bem como a existência de efeitos de segunda ordem, tais como maior exigência de garantias e a redução do número de contratos. Aqueles produtores que não quebraram seus contratos também foram negativamente afetados com as estratégias adotadas pelas empresas de processamento e comercialização. O conceito de “Função social do contrato” introduzido no Código Civil do Brasil está associado à elevação da instabilidade nos contratos, aumento nos custos de transação, bem como, a adoção de sanções econômicas......This study explores the instability created by contradictory court decisions related with contract breaches. Forward marketing contracts represent an important source of resources to finance Brazilian agriculture, however a large number of contract breaches were observed during a period of marked increase in soy prices. The study analyzed 161 judicial appeal decisions and a survey was carried with 70 farmers. The results show the difference of judges’ interpretation and the existence of second order effects. The effects of court decisions were more requirements of guarantees and the reduction in the number of contracts. Those soybean farmers who did not breach their contracts have also been negatively affected by the strategic reactions of trading and processing companies. The concept of “social function of the contract” introduced in Brazilian civil code led to a higher degree of instability in contracts, raising transaction costs and motivating private economic sanctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Rezende, Christiane Leles & Zylbersztajn, Decio, 2012. "Pacta Sunt Servanda Versus the Social Role of Contracts: the case of Brazilian agriculture contracts," Brazilian Journal of Rural Economy and Sociology (Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural-RESR), Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural, vol. 50(3), pages 1-16, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:rdecag:154909
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.154909
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    References listed on IDEAS

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