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Opieka zdrowotna w świetle teorii agencji

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  • Kowalska, Katarzyna

Abstract

The article explains economic interactions between the healthcare sector actors, as seen from the point of view of the superior - subordinate model and agency theory. The study does not focus on formal approaches. Instead, a description of contractual relationships between healthcare actors has been proposed along with responses to a specific structure of incentives (mostly financial ones). The article is an overview presenting up-to-date results of scientific research which employs the economic agency theory to analyse the healthcare sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Kowalska, Katarzyna, 2003. "Opieka zdrowotna w świetle teorii agencji," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2003(4), April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:polgne:350179
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.350179
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Smith, Peter C. & Stepan, Adolf & Valdmanis, Vivian & Verheyen, Piet, 1997. "Principal-agent problems in health care systems: an international perspective," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 37-60, July.
    2. Culyer, A J, 1989. "The Normative Economics of Health Care Finance and Provision," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 5(1), pages 34-58, Spring.
    3. Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
    4. Glenn M. MacDonald, 1984. "New Directions in the Economic Theory of Agency," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 17(3), pages 415-440, August.
    5. Danzon, Patricia M., 2000. "Liability for medical malpractice," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 26, pages 1339-1404, Elsevier.
    6. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    7. Clark, Derek & Olsen, Jan Abel, 1994. "Agency in health care with an endogenous budget constraint," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 231-251, July.
    8. Glenn M. MacDonald, 1984. "New Directions in the Economic Theory of Agency," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 8409, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    9. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    10. Mooney, Gavin & Ryan, Mandy, 1993. "Agency in health care: Getting beyond first principles," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 125-135, July.
    11. Levinthal, Daniel, 1988. "A survey of agency models of organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 153-185, March.
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    Keywords

    Health Economics and Policy;

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