IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ags/jlaare/30859.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Farmers' Preferences For Crop Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Lajili, Kaouthar
  • Barry, Peter J.
  • Sonka, Steven T.
  • Mahoney, Joseph T.

Abstract

An empirical approach combining elements of principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics is used to determine farmers' preferences for contract terms in crop production. The approach is tested by asking grain farmers to rank contract choices and specify price premiums in simulated case situations. The statistical results indicate that farmers' preferences for rates of cost sharing, price premiums, and financing arrangements are significantly influenced by asset specialization and uncertainty associated with the case situations, and by selected business and personal characteristics.

Suggested Citation

  • Lajili, Kaouthar & Barry, Peter J. & Sonka, Steven T. & Mahoney, Joseph T., 1997. "Farmers' Preferences For Crop Contracts," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 1-17, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:30859
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.30859
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/30859/files/22020264.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.30859?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    2. Joskow, Paul L, 1988. "Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 95-117, Spring.
    3. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    4. Anderson, Jock R. & Dillon, John L. & Hardaker, Brian, 1977. "Agricultural Decision Analysis," Monographs: Applied Economics, AgEcon Search, number 288652, January.
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    6. Riordan, Michael H. & Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. "Asset specificity and economic organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 365-378, December.
    7. Anderson, Jock R. & Feder, Gershon, 2007. "Agricultural Extension," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: Robert Evenson & Prabhu Pingali (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 44, pages 2343-2378, Elsevier.
    8. Thomas L. Sporleder, 1992. "Managerial Economics of Vertically Coordinated Agricultural Firms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(5), pages 1226-1231.
    9. Thaler, Richard, 1981. "Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 201-207.
    10. Gustafson, Cole R. & Barry, Peter J. & Sonka, Steven T., 1988. "Machinery Investment Decisions: A Simulated Analysis For Cash Grain Farms," Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 13(2), pages 1-10, December.
    11. Young Sook Eom, 1994. "Pesticide Residue Risk and Food Safety Valuation: A Random Utility Approach," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(4), pages 760-771.
    12. William Samuelson, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1533-1550, December.
    13. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    14. Kevin J. Boyle & Richard C. Bishop, 1988. "Welfare Measurements Using Contingent Valuation: A Comparison of Techniques," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 70(1), pages 20-28.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Williamson, Oliver E., 2010. "Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 215-226.
    2. Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999. "From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions," Post-Print halshs-03704424, HAL.
    3. Woodruff, Christopher, 2002. "Non-contractible investments and vertical integration in the Mexican footwear industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1197-1224, October.
    4. Stéphane Saussier, 1998. "La durée des contrats interentreprises : une analyse empirique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 135(4), pages 137-146.
    5. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
    6. Gonzalez-Diaz, Manuel & Arrunada, Benito & Fernandez, Alberto, 2000. "Causes of subcontracting: evidence from panel data on construction firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 167-187, June.
    7. Arrunada, Benito & Paz-Ares, Candido, 1997. "Mandatory rotation of company auditors: A critical examination," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 31-61, March.
    8. Dailami, Mansoor & Hauswald, Robert, 2000. "Risk shifting and long-term contracts : evidence from the Ras Gas Project," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2469, The World Bank.
    9. Williamson, Oliver, 2009. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 111-134, December.
    10. Thiele, Veikko, 2007. "The Demand for Tailored Goods and the Theory of the Firm," MPRA Paper 2471, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Saussier, Stephane, 2000. "Transaction costs and contractual incompleteness: the case of Electricite de France," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 189-206, June.
    12. Susan Helper, 1995. "Supplier Relations and Adoption of New Technology: Results of Survey Research in the U.S. Auto Industry," NBER Working Papers 5278, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Richard N. Langlois & Nicolai J. Foss, 1999. "Capabilities and Governance: The Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 201-218, May.
    14. Mikko Ketokivi & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2020. "Transaction Cost Economics As a Theory of Supply Chain Efficiency," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(4), pages 1011-1031, April.
    15. Sukkoo Kim, 1998. "The Rise of Multiunit Firms in U.S. Manufacturing," NBER Working Papers 6425, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Ursino Giovanni, 2015. "Supply Chain Control: A Theory of Vertical Integration," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(4), pages 1831-1866, October.
    17. Volker Mahnke, 2001. "The Process of Vertical Dis-Integration: An Evolutionary Perspective on Outsourcing," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 5(3), pages 353-379, September.
    18. Maloney, Michael T., 2017. "Alchian remembrances," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 561-582.
    19. Mahoney, Joseph T., 2012. "Towards a Stakeholder Theory of Strategic Management," Working Papers 12-0100, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    20. M'Hand Farès & Stéphane Saussier, 2002. "Coûts de transaction et contrats incomplets," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(3), pages 193-230.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Farm Management;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:30859. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/waeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.