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The show must go on: Zur politischen Ökonomie der Ländlichen Entwicklungspolitik in der EU

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  • Henning, Christian H.C.A.

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  • Henning, Christian H.C.A., 2005. "The show must go on: Zur politischen Ökonomie der Ländlichen Entwicklungspolitik in der EU," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 54(04), pages 1-4.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:gjagec:97215
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.97215
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Henning, Christian H.C.A., 2003. "Entkoppelte Direktzahlungen: Meilenstein auf dem Weg zu einer rationalen Wirtschaftspolitik und politische Entwaffnung der Agrarlobbyisten?," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 52(03), pages 1-3.
    2. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
    3. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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