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Empowering Small Farmers Through Collective Action: The Case Of Technology Development And Transfer

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  • Carney, D.
  • van Rooyen, C. J.

Abstract

Collective action could be the logical route to empowerment for fanners. By working together fanners can, in principle: identify members' needs and consolidate demand; aggregate members' economic power; and address market failures. These capacities would seem to make fanners' organisations the ideal partners in the area of agricultural technology transformation, which can be described as technology development and transfer. This is proven by the strength of "Organised Agriculture in South Africas commercial fanning". Iltis paper draws on research focused on emerging black fanners' organisations in South Africa and their involvement in agricultural technology. This research makes it clear that the key to effective change in the technology development supply system in South Africa, and thus to much needed productivity increases amongst black small fanners, is held by the technology system itself. In the absence of significant support, small fanners' organisations (as currently constituted) can be expected to play a restricted role - if any at all - for they are not yet sufficiently united, powerful or technologically-aware to force the opening of doors on their own initiative. One of the major lessons which must be drawn from this is that broader support to farmers' organisations to build capacity and particularly to develop internal communication mechanisms is likely to have to precede support for particular technology initiatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Carney, D. & van Rooyen, C. J., 1996. "Empowering Small Farmers Through Collective Action: The Case Of Technology Development And Transfer," Agrekon, Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), vol. 35(4), December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:agreko:268000
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268000
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    1. van Rooyen, Johan, 1997. "Challenges And Roles For Agriculture In The Southern African Region," Agrekon, Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), vol. 36(2), pages 1-25, June.
    2. Anseeuw, Ward & Laurent, Catherine & Modiselle, Salome & Carsten, Johan & van der Poll, Sakkie, 2001. "Diversity of the rural farming households and policy issues: an analysis based on a case study in the Northern Cape Province in South Africa," MPRA Paper 23768, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. van Rooyen, Johan & Sigwele, Howard, 1998. "Towards regional food security in southern Africa: a (new) policy framework for the agricultural sector," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 491-504, December.

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