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The Efficiency of Multi-Unit Electricity Auctions

Author

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  • Wedad Elmaghraby
  • Shmuel S. Oren

Abstract

Using a complete information game-theoretic model, we analyze the performance of different electricity auction structures in attaining efficiency (i. e., least-cost dispatch). We find that an auction structure where generators are allowed to bid for load "slices" outperforms an auction structure where generators submit bids for different hours in the day.

Suggested Citation

  • Wedad Elmaghraby & Shmuel S. Oren, 1999. "The Efficiency of Multi-Unit Electricity Auctions," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 89-116.
    • Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:1999v20-04-a04
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    Cited by:

    1. Ioannidis, Filippos & Kosmidou, Kyriaki & Makridou, Georgia & Andriosopoulos, Kostas, 2019. "Market design of an energy exchange: The case of Greece," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    2. Ramteen Sioshansi and Ashlin Tignor, 2012. "Do Centrally Committed Electricity Markets Provide Useful Price Signals?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4).
    3. Álvaro Riascos, Miguel Bernal, Luciano de Castro and Shmuel Oren, 2016. "Transition to Centralized Unit Commitment An Econometric Analysis of Colombia's Experience," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    4. Richstein, Jörn C. & Lorenz, Casimir & Neuhoff, Karsten, 2020. "An auction story: How simple bids struggle with uncertainty," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    5. Elmaghraby, Wedad J., 2005. "Multi-unit auctions with complementarities: Issues of efficiency in electricity auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 166(2), pages 430-448, October.
    6. Geun-Cheol Lee & Martin Höhenrieder & Jean-Paul Watson & David Woodruff, 2015. "Chance and service level constraints for stochastic generation expansion planning," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 169-191, December.
    7. Bunn, Derek W. & Oliveira, Fernando S., 2007. "Agent-based analysis of technological diversification and specialization in electricity markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 181(3), pages 1265-1278, September.
    8. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2008. "The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible," Working Papers 2072/13264, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    9. Fernando S. Oliveira & Derek W. Bunn & London Business School, 2006. "Modeling the strategic trading of electricity assets," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 235, Society for Computational Economics.
    10. Brijs, Tom & De Jonghe, Cedric & Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Belmans, Ronnie, 2017. "Interactions between the design of short-term electricity markets in the CWE region and power system flexibility," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 36-51.
    11. Ramteen Sioshansi & Emma Nicholson, 2011. "Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 41-61, August.
    12. Derek W. Bunn & Fernando S. Oliveira, 2008. "Modeling the Impact of Market Interventions on the Strategic Evolution of Electricity Markets," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(5), pages 1116-1130, October.
    13. Divényi, Dániel & Polgári, Beáta & Sleisz, Ádám & Sőrés, Péter & Raisz, Dávid, 2021. "Investigating minimum income condition orders on European power exchanges: Controversial properties and enhancement proposals," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 281(C).
    14. Joni L. Jones & Gary J. Koehler, 2005. "A Heuristic for Winner Determination in Rule-Based Combinatorial Auctions," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 475-489, November.

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    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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