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Carbon Border Adjustments, Climate Clubs, and Subsidy Races When Climate Policies Vary

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  • Kimberly A. Clausing
  • Catherine Wolfram

Abstract

Jurisdictions adopt climate policies that vary in terms of both ambition and policy approach, with some pricing carbon and others subsidizing clean production. We distinguish two types of policy spillovers from these diverse approaches. First, when countries have different levels of climate ambition, free-riders benefit at the expense of more committed countries. Second, when countries pursue different approaches, carbon-intensive producers within cost-imposing jurisdictions are at a relative competitive disadvantage compared with producers in subsidizing jurisdictions. Carbon border adjustments and climate clubs respond to these spillovers, but when countries have divergent approaches, one policy alone cannot address both spillovers. We also consider the policy dynamics arising from carbon border adjustments and climate clubs; both have the potential to encourage upward harmonization of climate policy, but come with risks. Further, the pressures of international competition may result in subsidy races, with attendant risks and benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Kimberly A. Clausing & Catherine Wolfram, 2023. "Carbon Border Adjustments, Climate Clubs, and Subsidy Races When Climate Policies Vary," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 137-162, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:37:y:2023:i:3:p:137-62
    DOI: 10.1257/jep.37.3.137
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    Cited by:

    1. Clausing Kimberly & Cramton Peter & Ockenfels Axel & Wolfram Catherine, 2024. "Strategic Climate Cooperation and Greenhouse Gas Price Coordination," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Sciendo, vol. 59(1), pages 55-56, February.
    2. Campolmi, Alessia & Fadinger, Harald & Forlati, Chiara & Stillger, Sabine & Wagner, Ulrich, 2023. "Designing Effective Carbon Border Adjustment with Minimal Information Requirements. Theory and Empirics," CEPR Discussion Papers 18645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2024. "Principles for Pareto Efficient Border Carbon Adjustment," CESifo Working Paper Series 11016, CESifo.
    4. Christoph Böhringer & Knut Einar Rosendah & Halvor Briseid Storrøsten, "undated". "Measures against carbon leakage. Combining output-based allocation with consumption taxes," Discussion Papers 1013, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    5. repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_495 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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