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Screening for Good Patent Pools through Price Caps on Individual Licenses

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  • Aleksandra Boutin

Abstract

Patent pools reduce prices when selling complementary inputs to technologies, but can also effectively cartelize markets when involving substitutes. Independent licensing, by reintroducing competition, ensures that only good pools form when there are two patent holders involved. For larger pools, independent licensing needs to be complemented by other policy tools. We propose to constrain the royalties for the patents individually licensed outside the pool with price caps replicating the pool's sharing rule. This information-free screening device works with asymmetries, even when licensors try to stabilize pools by readjusting the sharing rule in a way that may not reflect contributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleksandra Boutin, 2016. "Screening for Good Patent Pools through Price Caps on Individual Licenses," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 64-94, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:8:y:2016:i:3:p:64-94
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140237
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Josh Lerner & Marcin Strojwas & Jean Tirole, 2007. "The design of patent pools: the determinants of licensing rules," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 610-625, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lampert, Hodaya & Wettstein, David, 2020. "Patents and pools in pyramidal innovation structures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    2. Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 2019. "Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(6), pages 3018-3069.
    3. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2019. "Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 40-58.
    4. Jean Tirole, 2015. "Market Failures and Public Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(6), pages 1665-1682, June.
    5. Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2016. "The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents," Working Papers wp2016_1608, CEMFI.
    6. Ishihara, Akifumi & Yanagawa, Noriyuki, 2018. "Dark sides of patent pools with independent licensing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-34.
    7. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2015. "Patent pools, litigation, and innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 499-523, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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