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Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games

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  • John H. Kagel
  • Peter McGee

Abstract

In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results from the psychology literature. This quickly gives way to teams cooperating more than individuals. Team dialogues show increased payoffs from cooperation, along with anticipating opponents’ recognition of the same, provides the basis for cooperation, even while fully anticipating defection near the end game. A strong status quo bias in defecting across super-games limits unraveling. Defecting typically occurs one round earlier across super-games, consistent with low marginal, or even negative, benefits of more than one-step-ahead defection. (JEL C72, C73, C90, D12)

Suggested Citation

  • John H. Kagel & Peter McGee, 2016. "Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 253-276, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:8:y:2016:i:2:p:253-76
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140068
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis

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