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Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner's Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms

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  • Alejandro Francetich

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of sequentially allocating time sensitive goods, or one-period leases on a durable good, among agents who compete through time and learn about the common component of their valuation privately through experience. I show that efficiency is unattainable, and I identify simple variations of sequential second price or English auctions that implement the second best and the revenue-maximizing auctions. When the units are divisible, I identify the corresponding auctions that allow for double sourcing. (JEL D44, D82)

Suggested Citation

  • Alejandro Francetich, 2015. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner's Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 45-76, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:2:p:45-76
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130226
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Barbosa, Klenio & Boyer, Pierre C., 2021. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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