Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner's Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130226
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Cited by:
- Barbosa, Klenio & Boyer, Pierre C., 2021.
"Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
- Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo.
- Klenio Barbosa & Pierre Boyer, 2016. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," Working Papers 2016-37, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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