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Security Price Informativeness with Delegated Traders

Author

Listed:
  • Gary Gorton
  • Ping He
  • Lixin Huang

Abstract

Trade in securities markets is conducted by agents acting for principals, using "mark-to-market" contracts whereby performance is assessed using security market prices. We endogenize contract choices, information production, informed trading, and security price informativeness. But there is a contract externality. Prices are informative only because other principals induce their agents to trade based on privately produced information. The agent-traders then have an incentive to coordinate and shirk. The market price is less informative, reducing the effectiveness of mark-to-market contracts. By using managerial discretion to vary the contract type unpredictably, principals mitigate traders' coordinated manipulation and improve price informativeness. (JEL D82, D86, G12)

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Gorton & Ping He & Lixin Huang, 2010. "Security Price Informativeness with Delegated Traders," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 137-170, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:2:y:2010:i:4:p:137-70
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.4.137
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Cremers, Martijn & Pareek, Ankur, 2016. "Patient capital outperformance: The investment skill of high active share managers who trade infrequently," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 288-306.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

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