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Should First-Price Auctions Be Transparent?

Author

Listed:
  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Johannes Hörner

Abstract

We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with independent private and persistent values. We analyze three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. In the minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation is efficient and the minimal disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria. In contrast, in disclosure settings where either all or only the winner's bids are public, an inefficient pooling equilibrium with low revenues exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Hörner, 2018. "Should First-Price Auctions Be Transparent?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 177-218, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:10:y:2018:i:3:p:177-218
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160278
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Helmuts Āzacis, 2020. "Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 411-444, June.
    2. Ronen Gradwohl & Rann Smorodinsky, 2021. "Privacy, Patience, and Protection," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 759-784, December.
    3. Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2021. "Auctions with signaling concerns," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 420-448, May.
    4. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2021. "Strategic Leaks in First-Price Auctions and Tacit Collusion: The Case of Spying and Counter-Spying," CESifo Working Paper Series 9021, CESifo.
    5. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2019. "Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 611-632.
    7. Chernulich, Aleksei & Horowitz, John & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Rud, Olga A & Sharifova , Manizha, 2021. "Entry and exit decisions under public and private information: An experiment," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2021/3, University of Stavanger.
    8. Aleksei Chernulich & John Horowitz & Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga Rud & Manizha Sharifova, 2023. "Entry and exit decisions under public and private information: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(2), pages 339-356, April.
    9. Shuang Xu & Yong Zhao & Yeming Gong, 2021. "Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 261-292, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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