Regulation under Asymmetric Information in Water Utilities
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282806777212369
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Eugenio J. Miravete & Katja Seim & Jeff Thurk, 2018.
"Market Power and the Laffer Curve,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1651-1687, September.
- Miravete, Eugenio & Seim, Katja & Thurk, Jeff, 2017. "Market Power and the Laffer Curve," CEPR Discussion Papers 12502, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2009.
"Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
hal-00622963, HAL.
- Ivaldi, Marc, 2009. "Contract choice, incentives and political capture in public transport services," UC3M Working papers. Economics we096641, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2009. "Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services," Working Papers hal-00622963, HAL.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013.
"The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2009. "The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector," UC3M Working papers. Economics we096742, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Post-Print hal-00710639, HAL.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00710639, HAL.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," TSE Working Papers 10-190, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00710639, HAL.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," IDEI Working Papers 637, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Martimort, David & Ivaldi, Marc & Gagnepain, Philippe, 2010. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 8042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2017.
"Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 1-38, March.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2017. "Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01524894, HAL.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2017. "Economic Efficiency and Political Capture in Public Service Contracts," Post-Print halshs-01524894, HAL.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Pouyet, Jerome, 2018.
"Eliciting the regulation of an economic system: The case of the French rail industry,"
Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 21-30.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2010. "Eliciting the Regulation of an Economic System: The Case of the French Rail Industry," IDEI Working Papers 650, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Marc Ivaldi & Jérôme Pouyet, 2018. "Eliciting the regulation of an economic system: the case of the French rail industry," Post-Print hal-03263183, HAL.
- Marc Ivaldi & Jérôme Pouyet, 2018. "Eliciting the regulation of an economic system: the case of the French rail industry," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03263183, HAL.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2010. "Eliciting the Regulation of an Economic System: The Case of the French Rail Industry," TSE Working Papers 10-206, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Barbosa, Alexandro & Lima, Severino Cesário de & Brusca, Isabel, 2016. "Governance and efficiency in the Brazilian water utilities: A dynamic analysis in the process of universal access," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(PA), pages 82-96.
- Ali Yurukoglu & Claire Lim, 2014. "Dynamic Natural Monopoly Regulation: Time Inconsistency, Asymmetric Information, and Political Environments," 2014 Meeting Papers 530, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Guerriero, Carmine, 2013.
"The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 91-107.
- Guerriero, Carmine, 2008. "The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 36755, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Carmine Guerriero, 2008. "The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States," Working Papers 2008.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Garrett, Daniel F., 2020.
"Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting,"
TSE Working Papers
20-1140, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Garrett, Daniel, 2020. "Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2010.
"The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts,"
Working Papers
hal-00622961, HAL.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2010. "The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00622961, HAL.
- repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc, 2010.
"Regulatory Schemes and Political Capture in a Local Public Sector,"
TSE Working Papers
10-158, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc, 2010. "Regulatory Schemes and Political Capture in a Local Public Sector," IDEI Working Papers 609, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jansen, Jos & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2008. "The organization of regulated production: Complementarities, correlation and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 327-353, January.
- Sun, Yanshuo & Gong, Hengye & Guo, Qianwen & Schonfeld, Paul & Li, Zhongfei, 2020. "Regulating a public transit monopoly under asymmetric cost information," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 496-522.
- Haug, Peter, 2007. "Local Government Control and Efficiency of the Water Industry: An Empirical Analysis of Water Suppliers in East Germany," IWH Discussion Papers 3/2007, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
- Barbosa, Alexandro & Brusca, Isabel, 2015. "Governance structures and their impact on tariff levels of Brazilian water and sanitation corporations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 94-105.
- repec:hal:pseose:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
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