Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.1.316
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002.
"Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 429-450, December.
- Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: Unique equilibrium and transparency," Munich Reprints in Economics 19430, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998.
"Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
- Morris, S & Song Shin, H, 1996. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Economics Papers 126, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1997. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1687, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Manuela Goretti, 2005.
"The Brazilian currency turmoil of 2002: a nonlinear analysis,"
International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(4), pages 289-306.
- Manuela Goretti, 2005. "The Brazilian Currency Turmoil of 2002: A Nonlinear Analysis," International Finance 0506001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
- Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007.
"Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
- Rosemarie Nagel & Antonio Cabrales & Roc Armenter, 2002. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 601, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Bannier, Christina E., 2003. "Privacy or Publicity - Who Drives the Wheel?," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/29, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Chanelle Duley & Prasanna Gai, 2020. "When the penny doesn't drop - Macroeconomic tail risk and currency crises," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 520, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
- Camille Cornand, 2006.
"Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: an Experimental Study,"
Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 797-817, November.
- Camille Cornand, 2004. "Speculative Attack and Informational Structure: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0407, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Camille Cornand, 2008. "Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: an Experimental Study," Post-Print hal-00279185, HAL.
- Camille Cornand, 2006. "Speculative Attack and Informational Structure: an Experimental Study," Post-Print halshs-00360088, HAL.
- Camille Cornand, 2004. "Speculative Attack and Informational Structure: An Experimental Study," Post-Print halshs-00180118, HAL.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2015.
"Macro-expérimentation autour des fonctions des banques centrales,"
Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 3-47.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2015. "Macro-expérimentation autour des fonctions des banques centrales," Post-Print halshs-01232455, HAL.
- König, Philipp & Anand, Kartik & Heinemann, Frank, 2013.
"The ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, transparency, and systemic liquidity risk,"
VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order
79747, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- König, Philipp & Anand, Kartik & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "The 'Celtic Crisis': Guarantees, transparency, and systemic liquidity risk," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2013-025, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Philipp König & Kartik Anand & Frank Heinemann, 2013. "The ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, Transparency and Systemic Liquidity Risk," Staff Working Papers 13-31, Bank of Canada.
- Helland, Leif & Iachan, Felipe S. & Juelsrud, Ragnar E. & Nenov, Plamen T., 2021. "Information quality and regime change: Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 538-554.
- Kasahara, Tetsuya, 2009. "Coordination failure among multiple lenders and the role and effects of public policy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 183-198, June.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008.
"Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, April.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, April.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2004. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," CESifo Working Paper Series 1353, CESifo.
- Camille Cornand, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Post-Print halshs-00137529, HAL.
- Cornand, Camille & Heinemann, Frank, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 158, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Camille Cornand, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Post-Print halshs-00137519, HAL.
- Camille Cornand, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Post-Print halshs-00137532, HAL.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Post-Print hal-00279244, HAL.
- Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2003.
"Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1433R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2004.
- Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1433, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Meixing Dai, 2009.
"Public debt and currency crisis: how central bank opacity can make things bad?,"
Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(1), pages 190-198.
- Dai, Meixing, 2008. "Public debt and currency crisis: how central bank opacity can make things bad?," MPRA Paper 13867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ahnert, Toni & Bertsch, Christoph, 2013.
"A wake-up call: information contagion and strategic uncertainty,"
Working Paper Series
282, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden), revised 01 Mar 2014.
- Toni Ahnert & Christoph Bertsch, 2015. "A Wake-Up-Call Theory of Contagion," Staff Working Papers 15-14, Bank of Canada.
- König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022.
"Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
- Christian König-Kersting & Stefan Trautmann & Razvan Vlahu, 2020. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Working Papers 665, DNB.
- König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2020. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Research Discussion Papers 14/2020, Bank of Finland.
- repec:stn:sotoec:1401 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 2009.
"Speculative attacks: A laboratory study in continuous time,"
Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1064-1082, October.
- Yin-Wong Cheung & Daniel Friedman, 2008. "Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time," CESifo Working Paper Series 2420, CESifo.
- Yin-Wong Cheung & Daniel Friedman, 2009. "Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time," Working Papers 072009, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2009.
"Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 73-102, March.
- Cornand, Camille & Heinemann, Frank, 2005. "Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 157, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2009. "Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information," Post-Print halshs-01704266, HAL.
- Cornand, Camille & Heinemann, Frank, 2006. "Speculative attacks with multiple sources of public information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24522, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Frank Heinemann & Camille Cornand, 2006. "Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information," FMG Discussion Papers dp570, Financial Markets Group.
- Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2004.
"Coordination risk and the price of debt,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 133-153, February.
- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 1999. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1241R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2002.
- Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2001. "Coordination risk and the price of debt," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25046, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 1999. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1241, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," FMG Discussion Papers dp373, Financial Markets Group.
- Christina Bannier, 2003. "The Role of Information Disparity in the 1994/95 Mexican Peso," International Finance 0310001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006.
"The pros and cons of higher transparency: the case of speculative attacks,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 215-246.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency : The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print hal-00279027, HAL.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Working Papers 0502, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print halshs-00137469, HAL.
- Jean-Pierre ALLEGRET & Camille CORNAND, 2006. "The pros and cons of higher transparency : the case of speculative attacks," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2006031, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print halshs-00180086, HAL.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:316-318. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.