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Notches

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  • Blinder, Alan S
  • Rosen, Harvey S

Abstract

Economists have an instinctively negative reaction to any government program that creates a "notch," that is, a discontinuity in a budget constraint. For example, welfare programs like public housing are structured so that a finite lump of benefits is lost all at once when a household's income crosses a certain threshhold. Such notches deserve their bad reputation --they effectively impose a high marginal tax rate over a small income range, which no doubt discourages work and promotes welfare dependency. However,this paper argues that in other contexts, tax and subsidy plans with notches should at least be considered as serious contenders when public policy seeks to encourage or discourage some activity. Using simulations,we show how notch schemes can dominate traditional linear schemes using a standard efficiency criterion.
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  • Blinder, Alan S & Rosen, Harvey S, 1985. "Notches," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 736-747, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:75:y:1985:i:4:p:736-47
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles L. Ballard & John B. Shoven & John Whalley, 1982. "The Welfare Cost of Distortions in the United States Tax System: A General Equilibrium Approach," NBER Working Papers 1043, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Rosen, Harvey S., 1979. "Housing decisions and the U.S. income tax : An econometric analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-23, February.
    3. Venti, Steven F. & Wise, David A., 1984. "Moving and housing expenditure: Transaction costs and disequilibrium," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 207-243.
    4. Seade, J. K., 1977. "On the shape of optimal tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 203-235, April.
    5. Alan J. Auerbach & Harvey S. Rosen, 1980. "Will the Real Excess Burden Please Stand Up? (Or, Seven Measures in Search of a Concept)," NBER Working Papers 0495, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Stuart, Charles E, 1984. "Welfare Costs per Dollar of Additional Tax Revenue in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 352-362, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhuan Pei, 2017. "Eligibility Recertification and Dynamic Opt-In Incentives in Income-Tested Social Programs: Evidence from Medicaid/CHIP," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 241-276, February.
    2. Sallee, James M. & Slemrod, Joel, 2012. "Car notches: Strategic automaker responses to fuel economy policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 981-999.
    3. Keshab Bhattarai & John Whalley, 2003. "Discreteness and the Welfare Cost of Labor Supply Tax Distortions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(3), pages 1117-1133, August.
    4. Woodland, A., 2016. "Taxation, Pensions, and Demographic Change," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 713-780, Elsevier.
    5. Jonathan R. Kesselman, 1992. "Income Security via the Tax System: Canadian and American Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Canada-U.S. Tax Comparisons, pages 97-150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Colombino Ugo & Locatelli Marilena & Narazani Edlira & O'Donoghue Cathal, 2010. "Alternative Basic Income Mechanisms: An Evaluation Exercise With a Microeconometric Model," Basic Income Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-31, September.
    7. Cowen, Tyler & Glazer, Amihai, 1996. "More monitoring can induce less effort," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 113-123, July.
    8. Christian Gillitzer & Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Joel Slemrod, 2017. "A Characteristics Approach to Optimal Taxation: Line Drawing and Tax‐Driven Product Innovation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 240-267, April.
    9. Janet Currie & Aaron S. Yelowitz, 1998. "Public Housing and Labor Supply," JCPR Working Papers 52, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
    10. Traxler, Christian & Westermaier, Franz G. & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2018. "Bunching on the Autobahn? Speeding responses to a ‘notched’ penalty scheme," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 78-94.
    11. Fischer, Will, 2000. "Labor Supply Effects of Federal Rental Subsidies," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 150-174, September.
    12. Derek Hum, 1986. "UISP and the Macdonald Commission: Reform and Restraint," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 12(s1), pages 92-100, February.

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