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Why Special Economic Zones? Using Trade Policy to Discriminate across Importers

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  • Matthew Grant

Abstract

Tariffs are generally assumed to depend on the product, not the identity of the importer. However, special economic zones are a common, economically important policy used worldwide to lower tariffs on selected goods for selected manufacturers. I show this is motivated by policymakers' desire to discriminate across buyers when a tax is intended to raise prices for sellers, through a mechanism distinct from existing theories of optimal taxation. Using a new dataset compiled from public records and exogenous changes in imports of intermediate goods, I find the form, composition, and size of US zones are consistent with the theory.

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  • Matthew Grant, 2020. "Why Special Economic Zones? Using Trade Policy to Discriminate across Importers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1540-1571, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:5:p:1540-71
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180384
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    2. Abagna, Matthew Amalitinga, 2023. "Special Economic Zones and Local Economic Activities in Ethiopia," MPRA Paper 117427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Cheng, Chen & Xing, Yiqing, 2023. "A screening perspective on experimental zones," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    4. Zhao, Chuanmin & Qu, Xi, 2024. "Place-based policies, rural employment, and intra-household resources allocation: Evidence from China’s economic zones," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    5. Zhao, Chuanmin & Xie, Rui & Ma, Chunbo & Han, Feng, 2022. "Understanding the haze pollution effects of China's development zone program," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • L60 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - General
    • R32 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis

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