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Strategyproof Choice of Social Acts

Author

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  • Eric Bahel
  • Yves Sprumont

Abstract

We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (social) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to each profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. An SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes. It is unanimous if it picks the feasible act that all agents find best whenever such an act exists. We offer a characterization of the class of strategyproof and unanimous SCFs in two settings. In the setting where all acts are feasible, the chosen act must yield the favorite outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent's favorite outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules. In a setting where each state of nature defines a possibly different subset of available outcomes, bilaterally dictatorial or consensual rules can only be used to assign control rights over states characterized by identical sets of available outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Bahel & Yves Sprumont, 2020. "Strategyproof Choice of Social Acts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(2), pages 596-627, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:2:p:596-627
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171553
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Bahel, 2024. "Anonymous and Strategy-Proof Voting under Subjective Expected Utility Preferences," Papers 2401.04060, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
    2. Bahel, Eric & Sprumont, Yves, 2021. "Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 94-99.
    3. Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, 2022. "Ambiguous Social Choice Functions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 660, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    4. Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2019. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2003-2035, November.
    5. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 25-105.
    6. Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2022. "Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 581-604, December.
    7. Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand, 2021. "Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 331-351.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock

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