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Treatment Effects and Informative Missingness with an Application to Bank Recapitalization Programs

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  • Angela Vossmeyer

Abstract

This article develops a Bayesian framework for estimating multivariate treatment effect models in the presence of sample selection. The methodology is applied to a banking study that evaluates the effectiveness of lender of last resort (LOLR) policies and their ability to resuscitate the financial system. This paper employs a novel bank-level dataset from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and jointly models a bank's decision to apply for a loan, the LOLR's decision to approve the loan, and the bank's performance a few years after the disbursements. This framework offers practical estimation tools to unveil new answers to important regulatory questions.

Suggested Citation

  • Angela Vossmeyer, 2014. "Treatment Effects and Informative Missingness with an Application to Bank Recapitalization Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 212-217, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:212-17
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.212
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Butkiewicz James L., 1995. "The Impact of a Lender of Last Resort during the Great Depression: The Case of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 197-216, April.
    2. Li, Phillip, 2011. "Estimation of sample selection models with two selection mechanisms," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 1099-1108, February.
    3. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2006. "How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail? A Review of Gary Stern and Ron Feldman's Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 988-1004, December.
    4. Chib, Siddhartha, 2007. "Analysis of treatment response data without the joint distribution of potential outcomes," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 401-412, October.
    5. Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-276, June.
    6. Joseph Mason, 2001. "Do Lender of Last Resort Policies Matter? The Effects of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to Banks During the Great Depression," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(1), pages 77-95, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Angela Vossmeyer, 2019. "Analysis of Stigma and Bank Credit Provision," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(1), pages 163-194, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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