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Comparison of Alternative Payment Mechanisms for French Treasury Auctions

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  • Olivier Armantier
  • Erwann Sbaï

Abstract

Treasury auctions around the world have been typically conducted under either the uniform-price or discriminatory format. We propose alternative payment mechanisms including the uniform-price and discriminatory formats as special cases. We compare the properties of these alternative formats in the specific context of French Treasury auctions. Our results indicate that a new payment mechanism, named the "kth-average-price" auction, dominates all other formats in terms of the revenues it would raise for the French Treasury. The so-called "Spanish auction" however, is found to generate the most stable stream of revenues from one auction to the next.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Armantier & Erwann Sbaï, 2009. "Comparison of Alternative Payment Mechanisms for French Treasury Auctions," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 93-94, pages 109-133.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:109-133
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27917386
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    Cited by:

    1. K. Ruddell & A. B. Philpott & A. Downward, 2017. "Supply Function Equilibrium with Taxed Benefits," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 1-18, February.
    2. Edward Anderson & Pär Holmberg, 2023. "Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand," Working Papers EPRG2310, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    3. Timothy P. Hubbard & Harry J. Paarsch, 2012. "On the Numerical Solution of Equilibria in Auction Models with Asymmetries within the Private-Values Paradigm," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 291, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    4. Olivier Armantier & Nourredine Lafhel, 2009. "Comparison of Auction Formats in Canadian Government Auctions," Staff Working Papers 09-5, Bank of Canada.
    5. Burkett, Justin & Woodward, Kyle, 2020. "Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).

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