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Shared Consumption : A Technological Analysis

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  • John A. Weymark

Abstract

James Buchanan (Economica, [1966]) has argued that Alfred Marshall's theory of jointly-supplied goods can be extended to analyze the allocation of impure public goods. This article introduces a way of modelling sharing technologies for jointly-supplied goods that captures the essential features of Buchanan's proposal. Public and private goods are special cases of shared goods obtained by appropriately specifying the sharing technology. Necessary conditions for an allocation in a shared goods economy to be Pareto optimal are identified and related to the optimality conditions for public and private goods.

Suggested Citation

  • John A. Weymark, 2004. "Shared Consumption : A Technological Analysis," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 75-76, pages 175-195.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2004:i:75-76:p:175-195
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Monique Florenzano, 2009. "From equilibrium models to mechanism design: On the place and the role of government in the public goods provision analysis in the second part of the twentieth century," Post-Print halshs-00367859, HAL.
    2. Monique Florenzano, 2010. "Government and the provision of public goods:from equilibrium models to mechanismdesign," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(4), pages 1047-1077.
    3. Monique Florenzano, 2009. "Walras-Lindahl-Wicksell: What equilibrium concept for public goods provision," Working Papers halshs-00531434, HAL.
    4. Monique Florenzano, 2009. "Walras-Lindahl-Wicksell: What equilibrium concept for public goods provision ? I - The convex case," Post-Print halshs-00367867, HAL.

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    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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