IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/adr/anecst/y2000i58p253-287.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Appariements sur le marché du logement

Author

Listed:
  • Gabriel Desgranges
  • Étienne Wasmer

Abstract

This paper attempts to build a theory of rental housing markets in which search frictiona are made endogenous by a matching function between landlords and agents willing to rent. The rent is determined either according to a "Nash-bargaining" game between landlords and tenants, or fixed ex ante by the tenant. In both cases, we discuss the impact of the taxation of vacant apartments and show that protecting the tenants has an adverse effect on the outsiders, as on the labor market.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriel Desgranges & Étienne Wasmer, 2000. "Appariements sur le marché du logement," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 58, pages 253-287.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2000:i:58:p:253-287
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076236
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Burda, Michael & Wyplosz, Charles, 1994. "Gross worker and job flows in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 1287-1315, June.
    2. Arnott, Richard, 1989. "Housing Vacancies, Thin Markets, and Idiosyncratic Tastes," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 5-30, February.
    3. Read, Colin, 1993. "Tenants' search and vacancies in rental housing markets," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 171-183, April.
    4. Fujita,Masahisa, 1991. "Urban Economic Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521396455.
    5. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Peter A. Diamond, 1989. "The Aggregate Matching Function," NBER Working Papers 3175, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Implementation in generalized matching problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 429-439.
    7. Colin Read, 1988. "Advertising and Natural Vacancies in Rental Housing Markets," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 16(4), pages 354-363, December.
    8. Yinger, John, 1981. "A Search Model of Real Estate Broker Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 591-605, September.
    9. Turnbull, Geoffrey K. & Sirmans, C. F., 1993. "Information, search, and house prices," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 545-557, September.
    10. André Grimaud, 1990. "Boîte d'Edgeworth et théorie de la localisation," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(3), pages 531-546.
    11. Lundborg, Per & Skedinger, Per, 1999. "Transaction Taxes in a Search Model of the Housing Market," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 385-399, March.
    12. van Ommeren, Jos & Rietveld, Piet & Nijkamp, Peter, 1997. "Commuting: In Search of Jobs and Residences," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 402-421, November.
    13. Colin Read, 1991. "A Price Dispersion Equilibrium in a Spatially Differentiated Housing Market with Search Costs," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 19(4), pages 532-547, December.
    14. Rosenthal, Leslie, 1997. "Chain-Formation in the Owner-Occupied Housing Market," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 475-488, March.
    15. Anas, Alex, 1997. "Rent Control with Matching Economies: A Model of European Housing Market Regulation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 111-137, July.
    16. Thies, Clifford F, 1993. "Rent Control with Rationing by Search Costs: A Note," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 159-165, September.
    17. Read, Colin, 1997. "Vacancies and Rent Dispersion in a Stochastic Search Model with Generalized Tenant Demand," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 223-237, November.
    18. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1998. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 257-273, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mariona Segú & Benjamin Vignolles, 2016. "Taxing Vacant Apartments: Can fiscal policy reduce vacancy?," Working Papers 2016.02, International Network for Economic Research - INFER.
    2. Pierre-Philippe Combes & Bruno Decreuse & Benoît Schmutz & Alain Trannoy, 2010. "The Neighbor is King: Customer Discrimination in the Housing Market," IDEP Working Papers 1003, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Jun 2010.
    3. Segú, Mariona & Vignolles, Benjamin, 2018. "Taxing Vacant Dwellings: Can fiscal policy reduce vacancy?," MPRA Paper 85508, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Etienne Wasmer, 2005. "Housing market discrimination, housing regulations and intermediaries," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01053551, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8988 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Gabriel Desgranges & Étienne Wasmer, 2000. "Appariements sur le marché du logement," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 58, pages 253-287.
    6. Etienne Wasmer, 2005. "Housing market discrimination, housing regulations and intermediaries," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01053551, HAL.
    7. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/9023 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/9023 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Etienne Wasmer, 2005. "Housing market discrimination, housing regulations and intermediaries," SciencePo Working papers hal-01053551, HAL.
    10. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/9023 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/9023 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Maury, Tristan-Pierre & Tripier, Fabien, 2014. "Search strategies on the housing market and their implications on price dispersion," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 55-80.
    13. Ménard, Sébastien, 2012. "Should we tax vacant dwellings? A search equilibrium model applied to the rental housing market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 88-90.
    14. Forgionne, G. A., 1996. "Forecasting army housing supply with a DSS-delivered econometric model," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 561-576, October.
    15. Li-Min Hsueh & Hsi-Peng Tseng & Chang-Chiang Hsieh, 2007. "Relationship Between the Housing Vacancy Rate, Housing Price, and the Moving Rate at the Township Level in Taiwan, in 1990 and 2000," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 10(1), pages 119-150.
    16. Geoffrey Turnbull & Jonathan Dombrow, 2006. "Spatial Competition and Shopping Externalities: Evidence from the Housing Market," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 391-408, June.
    17. Turon, Helene & Simon Burgess, 2003. "Unemployment equilibrium and on-the-job search," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 208, Royal Economic Society.
    18. Paul Anglin & Richard Arnott, 1999. "Are Brokers' Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 27(4), pages 719-749, December.
    19. Boeri, Tito, 1999. "Enforcement of employment security regulations, on-the-job search and unemployment duration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 65-89, January.
    20. Wasmer, Etienne & Zenou, Yves, 2006. "Equilibrium search unemployment with explicit spatial frictions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 143-165, April.
    21. Jean Flemming, 2018. "Costly Commuting and the Job Ladder," 2018 Meeting Papers 100, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    22. J. Ignacio Garcia-Perez, 2002. "Equilibrium search models: the role of the assumptions," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 26(2), pages 255-284, May.
    23. Arnott, Richard & Igarashi, Masahiro, 2000. "Rent control, mismatch costs and search efficiency," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 249-288, May.
    24. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
    25. Myers, Erica, 2020. "Asymmetric information in residential rental markets: Implications for the energy efficiency gap," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    26. Tristan-Pierre Maury & Fabien Tripier, 2010. "Strategies for search on the housing market and their implications for price dispersion," Working Papers hal-00480484, HAL.
    27. Kawata, Keisuke & Sato, Yasuhiro, 2012. "On-the-job search in urban areas," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 715-726.
    28. Puhani, Patrick A, 1999. "Public Training and Outflows from Unemployment: An Augmented Matching Function Approach on Polish Regional Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 2244, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2000:i:58:p:253-287. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Secretariat General or Laurent Linnemer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ensaefr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.