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Information Disclosure in the REnewal of Patent

Author

Listed:
  • Claude Crampes
  • Corinne Langinier

Abstract

This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who knows the characteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has imperfect information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. We find equilibria where the incumbent prefers not to pay the renewal fee for the patent hoping that it will be interpreted by the challenger as a signal of low market profitability.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Crampes & Corinne Langinier, 1998. "Information Disclosure in the REnewal of Patent," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 49-50, pages 265-288.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:49-50:p:265-288
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076118
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. McAleer, Michael & Chan, Felix & Marinova, Dora, 2007. "An econometric analysis of asymmetric volatility: Theory and application to patents," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 259-284, August.
    2. Langinier, Corinne, 2004. "Are patents strategic barriers to entry?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 349-361.
    3. Emmanuel Combe & Etienne Pfister, 2000. "Patents against imitators: an empirical investigation on French data," Post-Print halshs-03724865, HAL.
    4. Emmanuel Combe & Etienne Pfister, 2000. "Patents against imitators: an empirical investigation on French data," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla00001, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    5. Felix Chan & Dora Marinova & Michael McAleer, 2004. "Trends and volatilities in foreign patents registered in the USA," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(6), pages 585-592.
    6. Karbowski, Adam & Prokop, Jacek, 2013. "Controversy over the economic justifications for patent protection," EconStor Conference Papers 127476, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    7. Corinne Langinier, 2005. "Using patents to mislead rivals," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(2), pages 520-545, May.
    8. Adam Karbowski, 2021. "Unproductive entrepreneurship and patents," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 52(5), pages 473-494.
    9. Karbowski, Adam & Prokop, Jacek, 2012. "Kontrowersje związane z ekonomicznym uzasadnieniem ochrony patentowej [Controversies over the economic justifications for patent protection]," MPRA Paper 73619, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Aoki, R. & Spiegel, Y., 1998. "Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R&D, and Welfare," Papers 30-98, Tel Aviv.
    11. Jinyoung Kim, 2015. "Patent Portfolio Management of Sequential Innovations: Theory and Empirics," Discussion Paper Series 1504, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    12. Aoki, Reiko & Spiegel, Yossi, 2009. "Pre-grant patent publication and cumulative innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 333-345, May.
    13. Jinyoung Kim, 2015. "Patent Portfolio Management of Sequential Inventions: Evidence from US Patent Renewal Data," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(2), pages 195-218, September.
    14. Jinyoung Kim, 2010. "Patent Portfolio Management of Sequential Innovations," Discussion Paper Series 1005, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    15. Dora Marinova & Michael McAleer, 2002. "Trends and volatility in Japanese patenting in the USA: An analysis of the electronics and transport industries," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 55(2), pages 171-187, August.
    16. Marc Baudry & Béatrice Dumont, 2009. "A Bayesian Real Option Approach to Patents and Optimal Renewal Fees," Working Papers hal-00419330, HAL.
    17. Emmanuel Combe & Etienne Pfister, 2000. "Patents against imitators: an empirical investigation on French data," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03724865, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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