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'Why Johnny Can't Regulate': A Reply to Henry Ergas

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  • Darryl Biggar

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  • Darryl Biggar, 2013. "'Why Johnny Can't Regulate': A Reply to Henry Ergas," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 20(2), pages 105-110.
    • Handle: RePEc:acb:agenda:v:20:y:2013:i:2:p:105-110
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    File URL: http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p269601/pdf/johnny.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Henry Ergas, 2013. "Why Johnny Can't Regulate: The Case of Natural Monopoly," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 20(1), pages 43-54.
    2. Biggar Darryl, 2009. "Is Protecting Sunk Investments by Consumers a Key Rationale for Natural Monopoly Regulation?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 1-25, June.
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