IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpla/9705003.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Learning to Perfect Manipulation: Implications for Fertility, Savings, and Old-Age Social Security

Author

Listed:
  • Lakshmi K. Raut

    (University of Hawaii-Manoa)

Abstract

In this paper we consider an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and two-sided altruism and show the limitations of applying commonly used open loop Nash equilibrium in characterizing equilibrium transfers from parents to children in the form of bequest, and transfers from children to parents as voluntary old-age support. Since in our model children are concerned with parents' old-age consumption, agents have incentives to save less for old age and to have more children so as to strategically induce their children to transfer more old-age support. We formulate such strategic behavior within a sequential multi-stage game and introduce a notion of learning equilibrium to characterize equilibrium manipulative behavior and then study the consequences of such strategic manipulations on private intergenerational transfers, fertility and savings decisions, and on Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocation. We show that the learning equilibrium notion of the paper simplifies computation of subgame perfect equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium is the long-run outcome of dynamic learning equilibrium paths (this aids in selecting, sometimes, a unique equilibrium among multiple subgame perfect equilibria), and an open-loop Nash equilibrium involves "incredible" threats from children. We provide an alternative explanation for the existence of publicly provided social security program and examine its role to correct distortions created by strategic manipulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Lakshmi K. Raut, 1997. "Learning to Perfect Manipulation: Implications for Fertility, Savings, and Old-Age Social Security," Labor and Demography 9705003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:9705003
    Note: Type of Document - pdf/pstscript; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on PostScript; pages: 25 ; figures: included. Not published. Posted for your comments.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/lab/papers/9705/9705003.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/lab/papers/9705/9705003.ps.gz
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-1093, Nov.-Dec..
    2. Lakshmi Kanta Raut, 1992. "Effect of Social Security on Fertility and Savings: An Overlapping Generations Model," Indian Economic Review, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 25-43, July.
    3. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
    4. Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(6), pages 467-467.
    5. Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1989. "Social Security as Trade among Living Generations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1182-1195, December.
    6. Nishimura, Kazuo & Zhang, Junsen, 1992. "Pay-as-you-go public pensions with endogenous fertility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 239-258, July.
    7. Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 151-182, July.
    8. Veall, Michael R., 1986. "Public pensions as optimal social contracts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 237-251, November.
    9. Kohlberg, Elon, 1976. "A model of economic growth with altruism between generations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-13, August.
    10. Pollak, Robert A, 1988. "Tied Transfers and Paternalistic Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 240-244, May.
    11. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December.
    12. Gary S. Becker & Robert J. Barro, 1988. "A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25.
    13. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-388, September.
    14. Diamond, P. A., 1977. "A framework for social security analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 275-298, December.
    15. Raut, L. K., 1990. "Capital accumulation, income distribution and endogenous fertility in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 123-150, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lakshmi K. Raut & Lien H. Tran, 1998. "Motives for investment in human capital of children: evidence from Indonesian Family Life Survey Data," Labor and Demography 9801001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Guataqui, Juan Carlos & García-Suaza, Andrés Felipe & Rodríguez-Acosta, Mauricio, 2009. "Ahorro para el retiro en Colombia: patrones y determinantes," Documentos de Trabajo 5792, Universidad del Rosario.
    3. Raut, Lakshmi K. & Tran, Lien H., 2005. "Parental human capital investment and old-age transfers from children: Is it a loan contract or reciprocity for Indonesian families?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 389-414, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lakshmi K. Raut, 1996. "Subgame perfect manipulation of children by overlapping generations of agents with two-sided altruism and endogenous fertility," Labor and Demography 9604003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Lakshmi K Raut, 2004. "Learned Convention and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in an Overlapping Generations Model with Two-Sided Altruism," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000172, David K. Levine.
    3. Cigno, A., 2016. "Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-660, Elsevier.
    4. Robinson, James A. & Srinivasan, T.N., 1993. "Long-term consequences of population growth: Technological change, natural resources, and the environment," Handbook of Population and Family Economics, in: M. R. Rosenzweig & Stark, O. (ed.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1175-1298, Elsevier.
    5. Andreas Wagener, 2002. "Intergenerational Transfer Schemes as Incomplete Social Contracts," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 337-359, December.
    6. Wolff, Francois-Charles & Laferrere, Anne, 2006. "Microeconomic models of family transfers," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, in: S. Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 889-969, Elsevier.
    7. Rizzo, Giuseppe, 2009. "Fertility and pension systems," MPRA Paper 12998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Yew, Siew Ling & Zhang, Jie, 2013. "Socially optimal social security and education subsidization in a dynastic model with human capital externalities, fertility and endogenous growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 154-175.
    9. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform," Economics Working Papers 385, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    10. Amihai Glazer & Hiroki Kondo, 2015. "Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 509-533, April.
    11. Ehrlich, Isaac & Lui, Francis, 1997. "The problem of population and growth: A review of the literature from Malthus to contemporary models of endogenous population and endogenous growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 205-242, January.
    12. Feldstein, Martin & Liebman, Jeffrey B., 2002. "Social security," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 32, pages 2245-2324, Elsevier.
    13. Elmendorf, Douglas W. & Gregory Mankiw, N., 1999. "Government debt," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 25, pages 1615-1669, Elsevier.
    14. Peter J. Stauvermann & Ronald R. Kumar, 2016. "Sustainability of A Pay-as-you-Go Pension System in A Small Open Economy with Ageing, Human Capital and Endogenous Fertility," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 2-20, February.
    15. Ren Mu & Yang Du, 2017. "Pension Coverage for Parents and Educational Investment in Children: Evidence from Urban China," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 31(2), pages 483-503.
    16. Nikolov, Plamen & Bonci, Matthew, 2020. "Do public program benefits crowd out private transfers in developing countries? A critical review of recent evidence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    17. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March.
    18. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-1351, December.
    19. Mi Luo & Matthew Shapiro & Joseph Briggs & Chris Tonetti & Andrew Caplin & John Ameriks, 2016. "Inter-generational transfers and precautionary saving," 2016 Meeting Papers 1616, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    20. Gonzalez, Francisco M. & Lazkano, Itziar & Smulders, Sjak A., 2018. "Intergenerational altruism with future bias," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 436-454.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    two-sided altruism; endogenous fertility; subgame perfect manipulation of children; social security;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:9705003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.