Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Non-Paternalistic

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Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Non-Paternalistic

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Neil Bruce (UCLA)
Michael Waldman (Queen's University)

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 532.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 1988
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:532

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Article
- Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-51, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1985. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1045-76, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages S151-82, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-93, Nov.-Dec.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cox, Donald, 1987. "Motives for Private Income Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 508-46, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bergstrom, T., 1995. "Economics of a Family Way," Papers 95-07, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
Other versions:
- Ted Bergstrom, 1996. "Economics in a Family Way," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1996B, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, 1995. "Economics in a Family Way," Labor and Demography 9507002, EconWPA, revised 06 Feb 1996. [Downloadable!]
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, . "Economics in a Family Way," ELSE working papers 018, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, 1996. "Economics in a Family Way," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(4), pages 1903-1934, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dye, Ronald A. & Antle, Rick, 1986. "Cost-minimizing welfare programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 259-265, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," UCLA Economics Working Papers 402, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," Working Papers 650, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 155-65, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Altig, D. & Davis, S.J., 1988. "Government Debt, Redistributive Fiscal Policies, And The Interaction Between Borrowing Constraints And Intergenerational Altruism," Papers e-88-35, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
Other versions:
- Altig, David & Davis, Steve J., 1989. "Government debt, redistributive fiscal policies, and the interaction between borrowing constraints and intergenerational altrusim," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 3-29, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- P. A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1977. "A Model of Social Insurance With Variable Retirement," Working papers 210, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1988. "Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 691-700, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Feldstein, Martin S, 1974. "Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(5), pages 905-26, Sept./Oct. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Pollak, Robert A, 1988. "Tied Transfers and Paternalistic Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 240-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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