IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tin/wpaper/20080072.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Degradation of Distorted Performance Measures

Author

Listed:
  • Randolph Sloof

    (University of Amsterdam, and IZA)

  • Mirjam van Praag

    (University of Amsterdam, IZA, and Max Planck Institute of Economics)

Abstract

Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be measured. Courty and Marschke (2007) have recently developed an elegant empirical test to detect distortion, based on the degradation of a performance measure subsequent to increasing its weight in the remuneration contract. We apply their test to assess the distortion of the often used class of performance measures that are based on ‘Residual Income’ (RI), such as ‘Economic Value Added’ (EVA). Residual income is widely used to measure and reward the performance of management boards. We use a difference-in-difference approach to account for (a) changes in economic circumstances in the period studied and (b) the self-selection of firms into the treatment and the control groups. Our results show that RI has degraded and is, therefore, a distortionary performance measure that can be gamed. Conditionally accepted for publication in the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization .

Suggested Citation

  • Randolph Sloof & Mirjam van Praag, 2008. "The Degradation of Distorted Performance Measures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-072/3, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080072
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/08072.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Reichelstein, S, 2000. "Providing managerial incentives: Cash flows versus accrual accounting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 243-269.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    3. George Baker, 2002. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 728-751.
    4. Bowen, Robert M. & Johnson, Marilyn F. & Shevlin, Terry, 1989. "Informational efficiency and the information content of earnings during the market crash of October 1987," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2-3), pages 225-254, July.
    5. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
    6. Fama, Eugene F & French, Kenneth R, 1996. "The CAPM Is Wanted, Dead or Alive," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(5), pages 1947-1958, December.
    7. Wallace, James S., 1997. "Adopting residual income-based compensation plans: Do you get what you pay for?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 275-300, December.
    8. Wagner, Alfred, 1891. "Marshall's Principles of Economics," History of Economic Thought Articles, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, vol. 5, pages 319-338.
    9. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
    10. Jerold L. Zimmerman, 1997. "Eva And Divisional Performance Measurement: Capturing Synergies And Other Issues," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 10(2), pages 98-109, June.
    11. Biddle, Gary C. & Bowen, Robert M. & Wallace, James S., 1997. "Does EVA(R) beat earnings? Evidence on associations with stock returns and firm values," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 301-336, December.
    12. Cramer, J S, 1973. "Interaction of Income and Price in Consumer Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 14(2), pages 351-363, June.
    13. Rogerson, William P, 1997. "Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Managerial Investment Incentives: A Theory Explaining the Use of Economic Value Added as a Performance Measure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 770-795, August.
    14. Dimitris Kyriazis & Christos Anastassis, 2007. "The Validity of the Economic Value Added Approach: an Empirical Application," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 13(1), pages 71-100, January.
    15. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    16. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October.
    17. Ahmad Ismail, 2006. "Is economic value added more associated with stock return than accounting earnings? The UK evidence," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 2(4), pages 343-353, September.
    18. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Randolph Sloof & Mirjam van Praag, 2015. "Testing for Distortions in Performance Measures: An Application to Residual Income‐Based Measures like Economic Value Added," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 74-91, March.
    2. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    3. Anthony M. Marino & Ján Zábojník, 2008. "Work‐related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 565-585, June.
    4. Robert Gibbons, 2010. "Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 337-365, September.
    5. François Larmande & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2007. "The lack of controllability of EVA explains its decline a field study," Working Papers hal-00243065, HAL.
    6. Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, C. Mirjam, 2010. "The effect of noise in a performance measure on work motivation: A real effort laboratory experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 751-765, October.
    7. François Larmande & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2004. "EVA and the Controllability-congruence Trade-off: An Empirical Investigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1257, CESifo.
    8. Bias, Daniel & Chen, Lin & Lochner, Benjamin & Schmid, Thomas, 2020. "Measuring workers' financial incentives," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 07/2020, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    9. Hensher, David A. & Ho, Chinh & Knowles, Louise, 2016. "Efficient contracting and incentive agreements between regulators and bus operators: The influence of risk preferences of contracting agents on contract choice," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 22-40.
    10. Bouwens, J.F.M.G. & van Lent, L.A.G.M., 2003. "Effort and Selection Effects of Incentive Contracts," Other publications TiSEM 46a62de7-d051-4620-93bb-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Bouwens, J.F.M.G. & van Lent, L.A.G.M., 2003. "Effort and Selection Effects of Incentive Contracts," Discussion Paper 2003-130, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2020. "Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 301-317, March.
    13. Jed De Varo & Suraj Prasad, 2015. "The Relationship between Delegation and Incentives Across Occupations: Evidence and Theory," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 279-312, June.
    14. Muurling, Rutger & Lehnert, Thorsten, 2004. "Option-based compensation: a survey," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 365-401.
    15. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016. "Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 137-192, March.
    16. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    17. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2007. "A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 13372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez & Sara Martinez-de-Morentin, 2017. "Performance Measurement and Incentive Intensity," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 496-546, December.
    19. Tomasz Obloj & Peter Zemsky, 2015. "Value creation and value capture under moral hazard: Exploring the micro-foundations of buyer– supplier relationships," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(8), pages 1146-1163, August.
    20. Margaret A. Abernethy & Jan Bouwens & Laurence Van Lent, 2013. "The Role of Performance Measures in the Intertemporal Decisions of Business Unit Managers," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(3), pages 925-961, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Residual income; EVA; degradation; distortion; performance measurement; management compensation; incentive compensation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080072. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tinbenl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.