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Sustaining Social Security

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Author Info
Martin Gonzalez-Eiras
Dirk Niepelt

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Abstract

We analyze the sustainability of intergenerational transfers in politico-economic equilibrium. We argue that these transfers naturally arise in a Markov perfect equilibrium in the fundamental state variables. In contrast to earlier literature, our explanation does not resort to altruism, commitment, or trigger strategies but rests on the incentive for young voters to monopolize capital accumulation, as pointed out by Kotlikoff and Rosenthal (1990); transfers to the old are instrumental in that respect. Introducing fully rational voters and probabilistic voting in the standard Diamond (1965) OLG model, we find that transfers in politico-economic equilibrium are too h i g h relative to the Ramsey equilibrium. Under standard functional form assumptions, we are able to analytically solve for the steady state and the complete transition dynamics in both the Ramsey and the probabilistic voting case. Under realistic parameter values, the model predicts a social security tax rate of 12 percent, compared to a Ramsey tax rate of 3.5 percent

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2004 Meeting Papers with number 199.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed004:199

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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003
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Related research
Keywords: Social security intergenerational transfers Markov perfect equilibrium probabilistic voting overlapping generations

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Michele Boldrin & Maria Cristina De Nardi & Larry E. Jones, 2005. "Fertility and Social Security," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000506, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bhaskar, V, 1998. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 135-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments," NBER Working Papers 5447, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. John Y. Campbell & Luis Viceira, 2005. "The Term Structure of the Risk-Return Tradeoff," NBER Working Papers 11119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1989. "A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 713-32, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. John Hassler & José V. Rodríguez Mora & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2001. "The Survival of the Welfare State," Economics Working Papers 603, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Lorenzo Forni, 2005. "Social Security as Markov Equilibrium in OLG Models," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(1), pages 178-194, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Phillip Swagel & Efraim Sadka & Assaf Razin, 2002. "The Aging of the Population and the Size of the Welfare State," IMF Working Papers 02/68, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  10. Antonio Rangel, 2003. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 813-834, June. [Downloadable!]
  11. Krusell, Per & Quadrini, Vincenzo & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1997. "Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 243-272, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Social Security," NBER Working Papers 3272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Juan C. Conesa & Dirk Krueger, 1999. "Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous Agents," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(4), pages 757-795, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Douglas Gollin, 2002. "Getting Income Shares Right," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 458-474, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1989. "Social Security as Trade among Living Generations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1182-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Michele Boldrin & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Political Equilibria with Social Security," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(1), pages 41-78, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka & Phillip Swagel, 2002. "The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare State," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 900-918, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1994. "Some Inefficiency Implication of Generational Politics and Exchange," NBER Working Papers 3354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Vincenzo Galasso & Paola Profeta, . "The Evolution of Retirement," Working Papers 278, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Alexander Ludwig & Michael Reiter, 2008. "Sharing Demographic Risk – Who is Afraid of the Baby Bust?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  3. Elizabeth M. Caucutt & Thomas F. Cooley & Nezih Guner, 2007. "The Farm, the City, and the Emergence of Social Security," NBER Working Papers 12854, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Olovsson, Conny, 2004. "The Welfare Gains of Improving Risk Sharing in Social Security," Seminar Papers 728, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
  5. Martín Gonzales-Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2007. "Population Ageing, Government Budgets, and Productivity Growth in Politico-Economic Equilibrium," Working Papers 07.05, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Roel Beetsma & Heikki Oksanen, 2007. "Pension Systems, Ageing and the Stability and Growth Pact," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  7. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Vincenzo Galasso & Paola Profeta, 2006. "Early Retirement and Social Security: A Long Term Perspective," CSEF Working Papers 165, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Song, Zheng, 2008. "The Dynamics of Inequality and Social Security in General Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 10365, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-21.

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