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Sorting, Incentives and Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Field Experiment

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Author Info
Charles Bellemare
Bruce S. Shearer

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Abstract

The, often observed, positive correlation between incentive intensity and risk has been explained in two ways: the presence of transaction costs as determinants of contracts and the sorting of risk-tolerant individuals into firms using high-intensity incentive contracts. The empirical importance of sorting is perhaps best evaluated by directly measuring the risk tolerance of workers who have selected into incentive contracts under risky environments. We use experiments, conducted within a real firm, to measure the risk preferences of a sample of workers who are paid incentive contracts and face substantial daily income risk. Our experimental results indicate the presence of sorting; Workers in our sample are risk-tolerant. Moreover, their level of tolerance is considerably higher than levels observed for samples of individuals representing broader populations. Interestingly, the high level of risk tolerance suggests that both sorting and transaction costs are important determinants of contract choices when workers have heterogeneous preferences.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0631.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0631

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Related research
Keywords: Risk aversion; sorting; incentive contracts; field experiments;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gourieroux Christian & Monfort Alain & Trognon A, 1981. "Pseudo maximum likelihood methods : theory," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8129, CEPREMAP.
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  2. Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, 2004. "Clean Evidence on Peer Effects," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000439, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Papers 0096, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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  4. Bruce Shearer, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 513-534, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Tor Eriksson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation," Post-Print halshs-00331753_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sabrina Teyssier, 2007. "Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection," Working Papers 0710, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 0821, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lisa R. Anderson & Jennifer M. Mellor, 2007. "Predicting Health Behaviors with an Experimental Measure of Risk Preference," Working Papers 59, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Antonio Cabrales & Raffaele Miniaci & Marco Piovesan & Giovanni Ponti, 2009. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts," Working Papers 2009-09, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Les Modes de Rémunération comme MécanismesSélectifs de la Main d’oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques," Post-Print halshs-00303703_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sabrina Teyssier, 2007. "Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection," Post-Print halshs-00144901_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  8. Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Les Modes de Rémunération comme Mécanismes Sélectifs de la Main d’oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques," Working Papers 0818, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  9. Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts," Post-Print halshs-00303727_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  10. Thomas Cornelißen & John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2008. "Performance Pay, Risk Attitudes and Job Satisfaction," SOEPpapers 136, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). [Downloadable!]
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