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Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Axel Ockenfels
Reinhard Selten
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Experimental sealed-bid first-price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given. The concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium, which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison, captures the data.
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Paper provided by University of Cologne, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number
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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 08 Apr 2004Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming Games and Economic BehaviorHandle: RePEc:kls:series:0007Contact details of provider: Postal: Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923 K�ln Phone: 0221 / 470 5607 Fax: 0221 / 470 5179 Email: Web page: http://www.wiso.uni-koeln.de More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Werner).
Keywords: Auctions ; Overbidding ; Feedback ; Experiments ; Ex-post rationality ; Bounded rationality ; Social comparison ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
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