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Information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions

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Author Info
Isaac, R. Mark
Walker, James M.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-46SX3XD-G/2/4f9354c9b9aba204bcc2e2181d2ecb44
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 6 (1985)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 139-159
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:6:y:1985:i:2:p:139-159

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  1. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu, 2002. "Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 531.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  2. Katerina Sherstyuk, 2002. "Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers 200207, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2001. "Collusion via Signaling in Multiple Object Auctions with Complementarities- An Experimental Test," Working Papers 200102, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Olivier Armantier & Nicolas Treich, 2006. "Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-15, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  5. Axel Ockenfels & Reinhard Selten, 2004. "Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions," Working Paper Series in Economics 7, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiss, J. Philipp & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2008. "A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions," Research Memoranda 050, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  7. Boeheim, Rene & Zulehner, Christine, 1996. "Auctions - A Survey," Economics Series 39, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
  8. Oliver Kirchkamp, & Eva Poen, & Philipp Reiß, 2006. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0605, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Katerina Sherstyuk, 1999. "Collusion Without Conspiracy: An Experimental Study of One-Sided Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 59-75, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Sascha Füllbrunn & Tibor Neugebauer, 2007. "An experimental investigation of collusion in hard-close auctions: partners and friends," FEMM Working Papers 07024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
  11. Werner Güth & Jeannette Brosig & Torsten Weiland, 2006. "Collusion mechanisms in procurement auctions: An experimental investigation," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-14, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  12. Kwasnica, Anthony M., 1998. "Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers 1010, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  13. Arthur Zillante, 2005. "Spaced Out Monopolies: Theory and Empirics of Alternating Product Releases," Industrial Organization 0505008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Emel Filiz & Erkut Y. Ozbay, 2005. "Auctions with Anticipated Regret," Experimental 0511006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2005. "Theory And Misbehavior Of First-Price Auctions: The Importance Of Information Feedback In Experimental Markets," Experimental 0503008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  16. Sherstyuk Katerina, 1999. "Collision in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers 1063, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2008. "Bidding ‘as if’ risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 190-202, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Jingjing Zhang, 2009. "Communication in Asymmetric Group Competition over Public Goods," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-06, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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