This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Xavier Jarque
Clara Ponsati
Jozsef Sakovics ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sucient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least ecient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/Mediation_Incomplete_info.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 75.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 34
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:75

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 50 George Square, EH8 9JY, Edinburgh
Phone: +44(0)1316508361
Fax: +44(0)1316504514
Web page: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Santiago Sanchez-Pages).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1992. "Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 597-625, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 188-201, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Gresik, Thomas A., 1996. "Incentive-Efficient Equilibria of Two-Party Sealed-Bid Bargaining Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 26-48, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dilip Abreu & Faruk Gul, 2000. "Bargaining and Reputation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 85-118, January.
    Other versions:
  6. Cramton, Peter C, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 205-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Sakovics Jozsef, 1993. "Delay in Bargaining Games with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 78-95, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R., 1989. "Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 107-133, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1993. "Efficient Sequential Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 435-61, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1995. "The war of attrition with incomplete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 239-254, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Leininger, W. & Linhart, P. B. & Radner, R., 1989. "Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 63-106, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Cramton, Peter C, 1984. "Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(4), pages 579-93, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Clara Ponsati-obiols, 1992. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Bargaining over Many Issues," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 25-26, pages 06, Janvier-J. [Downloadable!]
  15. Watson, Joel, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(3), pages 573-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Samuelson, Larry, 1987. "Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(2), pages 175-92, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Cho, In-Koo, 1990. "Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(4), pages 575-95, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ester Camiña & Nicolás Porteiro, 2007. "The Role of Mediation in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Negotiations," Working Papers 07.05, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use convenient plug-ins to search directly IDEAS from your browser.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.