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Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with

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We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

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  • Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsat?Author-Name: Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 502.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:502.01
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    Cited by:

    1. Paola Manzini & Clara Ponsati', 2001. "Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes," Game Theory and Information 0112001, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    Keywords

    Noncooperative games; bargaining theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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