References listed on IDEAS
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1. McFadden, Daniel, 1978. "Cost, Revenue, and Profit Functions," Histoy of Economic Thought Chapters, in: Fuss, Melvyn & McFadden, Daniel (ed.), Production Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory and Applications, volume 1, chapter 1 McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought. [Downloadable!]
2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1985. "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1151-72, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Samuelson, L., 1988. "Disagreement In Markets With Matching And Bargaining," Papers 9-86-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
7. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 807-18, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Perry, Motty, 1986. "An Example of Price Formation in Bilateral Situations: A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 313-21, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Sobel, Joel & Takahashi, Ichiro, 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(3), pages 411-26, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Raymond J. Deneckere, 2002. "Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Papers of Peter Cramton 02barg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 12 Mar 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Ausubel, Lawrence M. & Cramton, Peter & Deneckere, Raymond J., 2002. "Bargaining with incomplete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 50, pages 1897-1945 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Gale, Douglas, 1987. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Disagreement in Markets with Matching and Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 177-85, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Salant, Stephen W., 1984. "Litigation of Settlement Demands Questioned by Bayesian Defendants," Working Papers 516, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
15. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," Papers of Peter Cramton 92aer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
16. Binmore, Ken G & Herrero, M J, 1988. "Security Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pages 33-48, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1990. "Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(1), pages 63-78, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1988. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 713-28, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1986. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," Working Papers 616, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
20. Spier, Kathryn E, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Schweizer, Urs, 1989. "Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(2), pages 163-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Cramton, Peter C, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 205-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Peter Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Papers of Peter Cramton 92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
24. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
25. Daughety, Adnrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1993. "Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 314-48, October.
    Other versions:
    • Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation," Working Papers 91-23, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
26. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. Steven Shavell, 1981. "Suit and Settlement vs. Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs," NBER Working Papers 0662, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. I.P.L. P'ng, 1983. "Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 539-550, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
29. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 203-221, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Keeping Society in the Dark : On the Admissibility of Pretrial Nogotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 91-24, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
    • Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court," Game Theory and Information 9403008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 94-06, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
30. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
31. Binmore, Ken G & Herrero, M J, 1988. "Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pages 17-31, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Álvaro Bustos & Ronen Avraham., 2008. "The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Non-Economic Damages," Documentos de Trabajo 353, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
2. Pao-Li Chang, 2002. "The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism," Working Papers 475, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan. [Downloadable!]
3. Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-32, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
4. Langlais, Eric, 2005. "Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties
   [Compensation of damages and frequency of trials with asymmet," MPRA Paper 1150, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Éric Langlais, 2008. "Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'information sur l'aversion au risque des parties," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 74(2), pages 191-218. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Chris William Sanchirico, 2004. "Games, Information, and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History," Law and Economics 0403002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
6. Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse," MPRA Paper 8844, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
7. Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2008. "Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Philippe Choné ; Laurent Linnemer, 2008. "Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening," Working Papers 2008-16, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique, revised 2008. [Downloadable!]
8. Douglas Cumming, 2001. "Settlement Disputes: Evidence from a Legal Practice Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 249-280, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)