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Marriage, Commitment and Divorce in a Matching Model with Differential Aging

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Author Info
Adrian Masters (SUNY Albany)

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Abstract

This paper analyses a matching model of the marriage market with directed, on-the-job search. Everyone is born attractive but "matures" according to a Poisson process into unattractiveness. Marriages between equally attractive people are stable but mixed marriages are not. The implied patterns of marriage and divorce are consistent with those identified in the empirical literature. When the utility from being single is low, in order to commit to their relationship, attractive people in mixed marriages may voluntarily divest of their attractiveness. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2007.08.005
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 614-628
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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:05-61

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Related research
Keywords: Marriage; Matching; Directed search;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    Other versions:
  2. Gautier, Pieter A & Svarer, Michael & Teulings, Coen N, 2005. "Marriage and the City," CEPR Discussion Papers 4939, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Masters, Adrian M, 1999. "Wage Posting in Two-Sided Search and the Minimum Wage," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 809-26, November.
    Other versions:
  5. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
    Other versions:
  6. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-79, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alain Delacroix & Shouyong Shi, 2003. "Directed Search On the Job and the Wage Ladder," Working Papers shouyong-03-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Burdett, Ken & Coles, Melvyn G, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 141-68, February.
  9. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-58, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Pieter A. Gautier & Michael Svarer & Coen N. Teulings, 2007. "Sin City?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-021/3, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Pieter A. Gautier & Michael Svarer & Coen N. Teulings, 2007. "Sin City," IZA Discussion Papers 2632, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    • Gautier, Pieter A & Svarer, Michael & Teulings, Coen N, 2007. "Sin City?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6170, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Pieter A. Gautier & Michael Svarer & Coen N. Teulings, 2007. "Sin City?," CAM Working Papers 2007-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. [Downloadable!]
    • Pieter A. Gautier & Michael Svarer & Coen N. Teulings, 2007. "Sin City?," Economics Working Papers 2007-01, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  2. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2008. "An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage," IZA Discussion Papers 3892, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  3. Melvyn G. Coles & Marco Francesconi, 2007. "On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 2612, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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