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Economics at the FTC: Drug and PBM Mergers and Drip Pricing

Author

Listed:
  • Howard Shelanski
  • Joseph Farrell
  • Daniel Hanner
  • Christopher Metcalf
  • Mary Sullivan
  • Brett Wendling

Abstract

Economists at the Federal Trade Commission pursue the agency’s competition and consumer protection missions. In this year’s essay, in antitrust, we discuss two recent mergers that involved Rx drugs: First, we describe key elements of the inquiry into the Express Scripts/Medco transaction in the pharmacy benefit management industry. Next, we analyze a merger that involved drugs that are used to treat patent ductus arteriosus: a condition that affects premature babies. On the consumer protection side, we discuss a pricing strategy—drip pricing—that involves the release of price information about a multi-part product over time as the consumer goes through the purchase process. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York (outside the USA) 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Howard Shelanski & Joseph Farrell & Daniel Hanner & Christopher Metcalf & Mary Sullivan & Brett Wendling, 2012. "Economics at the FTC: Drug and PBM Mergers and Drip Pricing," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(4), pages 303-319, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:303-319
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-012-9360-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Meghan R. Busse & Jorge M. Silva-Risso, 2010. ""One Discriminatory Rent" or "Double Jeopardy": Multicomponent Negotiation for New Car Purchases," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 470-474, May.
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    3. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1979. "A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 851-858, August.
    4. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2009. "Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 427-452, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Robbert & Stefan Roth, 2018. "The importance of transparency signals in à la carte pricing," Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(1), pages 32-40, February.
    2. Shelle Santana & Steven K. Dallas & Vicki G. Morwitz, 2020. "Consumer Reactions to Drip Pricing," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(1), pages 188-210, January.
    3. Nathan H. Miller & Gloria Sheu, 2021. "Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 143-177, February.
    4. Panos Kouvelis & Yixuan Xiao & Nan Yang, 2015. "PBM Competition in Pharmaceutical Supply Chain: Formulary Design and Drug Pricing," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 511-526, October.
    5. Michael Grubb, 2015. "Failing to Choose the Best Price: Theory, Evidence, and Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(3), pages 303-340, November.
    6. Michael Salinger & Robert Levinson, 2015. "Economics and the FTC’s Google Investigation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(1), pages 25-57, February.

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