This paper develops a model of competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical differentiation. The main application is to add-on pricing – advertising low prices for one good in hopes of selling additional products at high prices. Price discrimination is self-reinforcing: the model sometimes has both equilibria in which all firms practice price discrimination and equilibria in which none do. The paper focuses on the Chicago-school argument that profits earned on add-ons will be competed away via lower prices for advertised goods. The most important observation is that the adoption of add-on pricing practices can create an adverse selection problem that makes price-cutting unappealing, thereby raising equilibrium profits. Although profitable when jointly adopted, using add-on pricing is not individually rational in the simplest model with endogenous advertising strategies. Several models that could account for the prevalence of add-on pricing are discussed.
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Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number
0049.
Length: 49 pages Date of creation: Jun 2004 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120(2), p. 585-637, May 2005 Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0049
Find related papers by JEL classification: L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets M30 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - General
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2006.
"Coarse Thinking and Persuasion,"
NBER Working Papers
12720, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Young Han Lee & Ulrike Malmendier, 2007.
"The Bidder's Curse,"
NBER Working Papers
13699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Justin P. Johnson Author-Email: jpj25@cornell.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Cornell University & David P. Myatt, 2006.
"Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly,"
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