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Peer Pressure and Incentives

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  • Kohei Daido

Abstract

We study the effects of peer pressure on incentives. To this end, we extend a multiagent model with moral hazard and limited liability by introducing a peer pressure function. We show that the optimal incentive for the less productive agent is more high powered than that for the more productive agent in the case with peer pressure. Moreover, in comparison with the case without peer pressure, the optimal incentive for the less productive agent becomes more high powered, while the optimal incentive for the more productive agent becomes less high powered.

Suggested Citation

  • Kohei Daido, 2006. "Peer Pressure and Incentives," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 51-60, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:58:y:2006:i:1:p:51-60
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0307-3378.2006.00233.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hideshi Itoh, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Other‐Regarding Preferences," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 18-45, March.
    2. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    3. Barron, John M & Gjerde, Kathy Paulson, 1997. "Peer Pressure in an Agency Relationship," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 234-254, April.
    4. Kohei Daido, 2004. "Risk-averse agents with peer pressure," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(6), pages 383-386.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kohei Daido, 2009. "Incentives, Identity, and Organizational Forms," Discussion Paper Series 47, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jul 2009.
    2. M.G. Lloyd, 2008. "Towards a ‘Pooled Sovereignty‘ in Community Planning in Scotland?," Local Economy, London South Bank University, vol. 23(1), pages 58-68, February.
    3. Burkhard Hehenkamp & Oddvar Kaarboe, 2006. "When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(1), pages 124-148, March.
    4. Cato, Susumu & Ebina, Takeshi, 2014. "Inequality aversion in long-term contracts," MPRA Paper 59893, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Kohei Daido, 2006. "Incentive Effects of Peer Pressure in Organizations," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(14), pages 1-10.
    6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2006:i:14:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Kohei Daido, 2004. "Risk-averse agents with peer pressure," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(6), pages 383-386.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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