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An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jinpeng Ma & Qiongling Li, 2016. "Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, December.
  2. Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2025. "A Universally Efficient Dynamic Auction for All Unimodular Demand Types," Discussion Papers 25/02, Department of Economics, University of York.
  3. Tomoya Kazumura & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016. "Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 633-663, October.
  4. Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 109-149, December.
  5. Jim Ingebretsen Carlson, 2020. "A speedy auction using approximated bidders’ preferences," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 288(1), pages 65-93, May.
  6. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021. "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
  7. Simon Finster, 2023. "Selling Multiple Complements with Packaging Costs," Papers 2306.14247, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
  8. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2017. "On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer–seller markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1137-1161, November.
  9. Hofstetter, Reto & Miller, Klaus M. & Krohmer, Harley & Zhang, Z. John, 2021. "A de-biased direct question approach to measuring consumers' willingness to pay," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 70-84.
  10. Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2024. "An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 9(1), pages 105-130, December.
  11. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  12. Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2017. "On a spontaneous decentralized market process," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 2(1), pages 1-37, December.
  13. Ian Dew‐Becker, 2023. "Tail Risk in Production Networks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(6), pages 2089-2123, November.
  14. Mingrong Wang & Mingxi Wang & Lihua Lang, 2017. "Reconsidering Carbon Permits Auction Mechanism: An Efficient Dynamic Model," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(8), pages 1624-1645, August.
  15. Jagadeesan, Ravi & Kominers, Scott Duke & Rheingans-Yoo, Ross, 2018. "Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 287-294.
  16. Ozan Candogan & Markos Epitropou & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2021. "Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 114-147, January.
  17. Kazuo Murota, 2016. "Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 151-273, December.
  18. Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul Klemperer, 2019. "Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(3), pages 867-932, May.
  19. Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, "undated". "Stable Matching Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/03, Department of Economics, University of York.
  20. Bernhard Kasberger & Alexander Teytelboym, 2022. "The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction," Papers 2203.11783, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  21. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "A Theory of Marriage with Mutually Consented Divorces," Discussion Papers 16/14, Department of Economics, University of York.
  22. Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, 2023. "Stable Matching Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/05, Department of Economics, University of York.
  23. Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2015. "Decentralised Random Competitive Dynamic Market Processes," Discussion Papers 15/27, Department of Economics, University of York.
  24. Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2020. "A Universal Dynamic Auction for Unimodular Demand Types: An Efficient Auction Design for Various Kinds of Indivisible Commodities," Discussion Papers 20/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
  25. Yan, Haomin, 2021. "Position auctions with multi-unit demands," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 179-193.
  26. Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2022. "Barter markets, indivisibilities, and Markovian core," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 39-48, January.
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