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How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation

In: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela & Lergetporer, Philipp & Sutter, Matthias, 2021. "Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 131-147.
  2. Markus C. Arnold & Eva Ponick, 2006. "Kommunikation im Groves-Mechanismus — Ergebnisse eines Laborexperiments," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 89-120, February.
  3. Yukihiko Funaki & Emmanuel Sol & Marc Willinger, 2021. "Equal division among the few: an experiment about a coalition formation game," CEE-M Working Papers hal-03227388, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
  4. repec:nad:wpaper:20220080 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. McGinn, Kathleen L. & Milkman, Katherine L. & Nöth, Markus, 2012. "Walking the talk in multiparty bargaining: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 278-291.
  6. Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi, 2023. "An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 88-104.
  7. Federica Alberti & César Mantilla, 2024. "A mechanism requesting prices and quantities may increase the provision of heterogeneous public goods," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(1), pages 244-270, March.
  8. Maria Montero & Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2008. "Enlargement and the balance of power: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(1), pages 69-87, January.
  9. Emin Karagözoglu & Martin G. Kocher, 2015. "Bargaining under Time Pressure," CESifo Working Paper Series 5685, CESifo.
  10. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Ramer, Roald & Schram, Arthur, 2016. "Formal versus informal legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 1-17.
  11. Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T. & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 28-46.
  12. Geoffroy de Clippel & Kareen Rozen, 2022. "Fairness through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 810-836, August.
  13. Vincent Mak & Rami Zwick, 2024. "Fairness and Transparency in One-to-Many Bargaining with Complementarity: An Experimental Study," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-29, June.
  14. Gantner, Anita & Horn, Kristian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2019. "The role of communication in fair division with subjective claims," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 72-89.
  15. Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2017. "Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results," Working Papers 1065, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
  16. Aguiar, Victor H. & Pongou, Roland & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, 2018. "A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 41-63.
  17. Christopher L. Newman & Melissa D. Cinelli & Douglas Vorhies & Judith Anne Garretson Folse, 2019. "Benefitting a few at the expense of many? Exclusive promotions and their impact on untargeted customers," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 76-96, January.
  18. Gerben A. Kleef & Eric Dijk & Wolfgang Steinel & Fieke Harinck & Ilja Beest, 2008. "Anger in social conflict: Cross-situational comparisons and suggestions for the future," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 13-30, January.
  19. Klaus Abbink & Lu Dong & Lingbo Huang, 2022. "Talking Behind Your Back: Communication and Team Cooperation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5187-5200, July.
  20. Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2005. "Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 278-311, February.
  21. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2022. "An experiment on the Nash program: Comparing two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value," ISER Discussion Paper 1175, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  22. Andrzej Baranski & Caleb A. Cox, 2023. "Communication in multilateral bargaining with joint production," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(1), pages 55-77, March.
  23. Frechette, Guillaume & Kagel, John H. & Morelli, Massimo, 2005. "Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1497-1517, August.
  24. Matthew McGinty & Garrett Milam & Alejandro Gelves, 2012. "Coalition Stability in Public Goods Provision: Testing an Optimal Allocation Rule," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(3), pages 327-345, July.
  25. Gary E Bolton & Jeannette Brosig, 2007. "How do coalitions get built - Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with renegotiation & externalities," Working Paper Series in Economics 30, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  26. Agranov, Marina & Tergiman, Chloe, 2014. "Communication in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 75-85.
  27. Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2020. "Using experiments to compare the predictive power of models of multilateral negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
  28. Petrowsky, Hannes M. & Schweinsberg, Martin & Seitz, Lennart & Funk, Burkhardt & Loschelder, David D., 2023. "Deal or no deal? How round vs precise percentage offers and price-ending mimicry affect impasse risk in over 25 million eBay negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
  29. Arleta Rasmußen, 2014. "The influence of face-to-face communication: a principal-agent experiment," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 22(1), pages 73-88, March.
  30. Baranski, Andrzej & Haas, Nicholas, 2023. "The timing of communication and retaliation in bargaining: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  31. James E. Smith & Detlof von Winterfeldt, 2004. "Anniversary Article: Decision Analysis in Management Science," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(5), pages 561-574, May.
  32. Gary Bolton & Jeannette Brosig-Koch, 2012. "How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 623-649, August.
  33. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2021. "An Experiment on the Nash Program: Comparing two Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value," GREDEG Working Papers 2021-07, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
  34. Bershadskyy, Dmitri & Sachs, Florian E. & Weimann, Joachim, 2023. "Collective bargaining in a shrinking group game: The role of information and communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 391-410.
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