IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/wly/emetrp/v89y2021i3p1313-1360.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Papers 2212.03360, arXiv.org.
  3. Wei He & Jiangtao Li & Weijie Zhong, 2024. "Rank-Guaranteed Auctions," Papers 2408.12001, arXiv.org.
  4. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
  5. Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2021. "Persuasion with Ambiguous Receiver Preferences," Papers 2109.11536, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  6. Piotr Dworczak & Alessandro Pavan, 2022. "Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2017-2051, September.
  7. Yang Cai & Yingkai Li & Jinzhao Wu, 2024. "Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions," Papers 2403.08145, arXiv.org.
  8. Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023. "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  9. Dirk Bergemann & Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2023. "Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules," Papers 2310.10024, arXiv.org.
  10. Pathikrit Basu, 2023. "Mechanism design with model specification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 263-276, August.
  11. Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2024. "Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1516, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  12. Kevin He & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Omer Tamuz, 2021. "Private Private Information," Papers 2112.14356, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  13. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
  14. Yi-Chun Chen & Gaoji Hu & Xiangqian Yang, 2022. "Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification," Papers 2210.16001, arXiv.org.
  15. Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2022. "Revenue Comparisons of Auctions with Ambiguity Averse Sellers," Papers 2211.12669, arXiv.org.
  16. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2023. "Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2375, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  17. Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023. "Is there a risk of a winner’s curse in farmland auctions?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 50(3), pages 1140-1177.
  18. Rosenthal, Maxwell, 2023. "Robust incentives for risk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
  19. Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2024. "Information Requirements for Mechanism Design," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-035, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  20. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  21. Jinsoo Bae & John H. Kagel, 2022. "Selling shares to budget-constrained bidders: an experimental study of the proportional auction," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(1), pages 45-55, December.
  22. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Robust Private Supply of a Public Good," Papers 2201.00923, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  23. Longjian Li, 2022. "Ambiguous Cheap Talk," Papers 2209.08494, arXiv.org.
  24. Xu Lang, 2023. "A Belief-Based Characterization of Reduced-Form Auctions," Papers 2307.04070, arXiv.org.
  25. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors," Papers 2204.13726, arXiv.org.
  26. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Information-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2205.04137, arXiv.org.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.