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Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Green, Daniel & Liu, Ernest, 2021. "A dynamic theory of multiple borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 389-404.
  2. Yaron Leitner, 2005. "A theory of an intermediary with nonexclusive contracting," Working Papers 05-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  3. Nicola Gennaioli & Stefano Rossi, 2013. "Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 602-634.
  4. Caballero, Ricardo J. & Krishnamurthy, Arvind, 2004. "Smoothing sudden stops," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 104-127, November.
  5. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi & Adriano A. Rampini, 2008. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 158-209, March.
  6. Mariano Tommasi & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2007. "Principal-Agent Contracts under the Threat of Insurance," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(3), pages 379-393, September.
  7. Gordon, Grey, 2017. "Optimal bankruptcy code: A fresh start for some," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 123-149.
  8. Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton, 2011. "Optimal Property Rights in Financial Contracting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(10), pages 3401-3433.
  9. Emmanuel Farhi & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2009. "A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 973-992.
  10. Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean-Paul Décamps, 2019. "Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 98-130, May.
  11. Yaron Leitner, 2004. "Non-Exclusive Contracts, Collateralized Trade, and a Theory of an Exchange," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 397, Econometric Society.
  12. Borys Grochulski, 2007. "Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Design: A Mirrlees Approach," 2007 Meeting Papers 1008, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  13. Olivier Jeanne, 2009. "Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2135-2148, December.
  14. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2009. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 879-902.
  15. Ábrahám, Árpád & Koehne, Sebastian & Pavoni, Nicola, 2011. "On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1331-1361, July.
  16. Bisin, Alberto & Rampini, Adriano A., 2006. "Markets as beneficial constraints on the government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 601-629, May.
  17. Christophe Chamley & Céline Rochon, 2011. "From Search to Match: When Loan Contracts Are Too Long," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(s2), pages 385-411, October.
  18. Bolton, Patrick & Jeanne, Olivier, 2005. "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority," CEPR Discussion Papers 4901, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Heski Bar-Isaac & Vicente Cuñat, 2014. "Long-Term Debt and Hidden Borrowing," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 3(1-2), pages 87-122.
  20. Leonardo Martinez & Juan Hatchondo, 2017. "Credit Risk without Commitment," 2017 Meeting Papers 1326, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  21. Pierre Yared, 2013. "Public Debt Under Limited Private Credit," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 229-245, April.
  22. Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN & Erik BERGLÖF & Gérard ROLAND, 2003. "Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 03.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
  23. Daniela Fabbri, 2001. "The Legal Enforcement of Credit Contracts and the Level of Investment," CSEF Working Papers 57, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  24. Yaron Leitner, 2009. "Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary," Working Papers 09-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  25. Yaron Leitner, 2010. "Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary," Working Papers 10-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  26. Dawen Meng & Guoqiang Tian, 2021. "The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 337-375, July.
  27. Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008. "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 781-803, October.
  28. Acharya, Viral & Bisin, Alberto, 2014. "Counterparty risk externality: Centralized versus over-the-counter markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 153-182.
  29. Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-6, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  30. Yaron Leitner, 2004. "Liquidity and exchanges, or contracting with the producers," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q1, pages 16-22.
  31. Yaron Leitner, 2003. "Non-exclusive contracts, collateralized trade, and a theory of an exchange," Working Papers 03-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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