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A Common Agency with Incomplete Information

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Cited by:

  1. Dur, Robert & Roelfsema, Hein, 2010. "Social exchange and common agency in organizations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 55-63, January.
  2. Rachel R. Chen & Esther Gal-Or & Paolo Roma, 2014. "Opaque Distribution Channels for Competing Service Providers: Posted Price vs. Name-Your-Own-Price Mechanisms," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(4), pages 733-750, August.
  3. Fiocco, Raffaele, 2016. "The strategic value of partial vertical integration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 284-302.
  4. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, 2018. "Endogenous timing when a vertically integrated producer supplies a rival," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 105-123, October.
  5. Batabyal, Amittrajeet A., 1996. "An agenda for the design and study of international environmental agreements," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 3-9, October.
  6. Semih Koray & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2001. "original papers : Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(1), pages 5-40.
  7. Batabyal, Amitrajeet A, 1998. "On land use, minerals development, and institutional design in the American west," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 139-146, September.
  8. Esther Gal‐Or, 1997. "Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 235-256, June.
  9. Versaevel Bruno & Vencatachellum Désiré, 2009. "R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-42, December.
  10. Matsushima, Noriaki & Shinohara, Ryusuke, 2014. "What factors determine the number of trading partners?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 428-441.
  11. Markus Reisinger & Tim Paul Thomes, 2017. "Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 923-954, December.
  12. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
  13. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2018. "On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 1-15.
  14. Versaevel Bruno & Vencatachellum Désiré, 2009. "R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-42, December.
  15. Esther Gal-Or & Qiaoni Shi, 2022. "Designing Entry Strategies for Subscription Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(10), pages 7597-7613, October.
  16. Raff, Horst & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2006. "Exclusive dealing and common agency in international markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 485-503, March.
  17. Brekke, Kurt Richard & Holmås, Tor Helge & Straume, Odd Rune, 2013. "Margins and market shares: Pharmacy incentives for generic substitution," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 116-131.
  18. Salvatore Piccolo & Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2012. "Colluding through suppliers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 492-513, September.
  19. Hongbin Cai & Walter Cont, 2004. "Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 703-729, December.
  20. Osano, Hiroshi, 1998. "Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 207-230, October.
  21. Leda Maria Bonazzi & Raffaele Fiocco & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Vertical Price Restraints and Free Entry Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 854-899, December.
  22. Esther Gal-Or & Mordechai Gal-Or, 2005. "Customized Advertising via a Common Media Distributor," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(2), pages 241-253, July.
  23. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 34, pages 2221-2299, Elsevier.
  24. Eduardo Saavedra, "undated". "Alternative Institutional Arrangements in Network Utilities: An Incomplete Contracting Approach," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv116, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
  25. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Competing Mechanisms: Communication under Exclusivity Clauses," Working Papers 2014-48, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  26. PAGE, Frank, 2000. "Competitive selling mechanisms: the delegation principle and farsighted stability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  27. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine.
  28. Cecile Aubert & Jerome Pouyet, 2000. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information and Institutional Incompleteness," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0806, Econometric Society.
  29. Xiaodong Wu, 2000. ""Pollution Havens" and the Regulation of Multinationals by Multiple Governments," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1766, Econometric Society.
  30. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-048 is not listed on IDEAS
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