Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered

Citations

Cited by:

1. At Christian & Friehe Tim & Gabuthy Yannick, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 1-11, April.
   • Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2018. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Working Papers of BETA 2018-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
   • Christian At & Tim Friehe & Yannick Gabuthy, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," Post-Print hal-02309475, HAL.
2. Matthias Kräkel, 2017. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 295-311, April.
   • Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 03/2013, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
   • Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 412, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   • Kräkel, Matthias, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," IZA Discussion Papers 7271, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
3. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
4. Jiancai Pi, 2018. "Another Look at Job Design with Conflicting Tasks," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 427-434, December.
5. Lorens Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2016. "Ex post unbalanced tournaments," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(1), pages 73-98, February.
6. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2015. "Merger efficiency and managerial incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 51-63.
   • Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 410, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
7. Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Self-organizing teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 195-197.
8. Anja Schöttner, 2017. "Optimal Sales Force Compensation in Dynamic Settings: Commissions vs. Bonuses," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(5), pages 1529-1544, May.
9. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2016. "Optimal sales force compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 179-195.
   • Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, 2014. "Optimal Sales Force Compensation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2014-09, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
10. Altan, Baṣak, 2019. "Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
11. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
    • Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2021. "Organizing Data Analytics," CEPR Discussion Papers 16768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2024. "Organizing data analytics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120780, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
12. Kräkel, Matthias, 2018. "Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation," IZA Discussion Papers 11289, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
13. Huseyin Gurkan & Francis de Véricourt, 2020. "Contracting, pricing, and data collection under the AI flywheel effect," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-20-01_R2, ESMT European School of Management and Technology, revised 17 May 2021.
14. Zhaolin Li & Steven Q. Lu & Jennifer K. Ryan & Daewon Sun, 2021. "Impact of Organizational Structure on Development Strategy under Equity‐Based Incentives," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(4), pages 984-996, April.
15. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79914, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
16. Dahai Li & Huan Wang & Yang Li, 2023. "Incentive Mechanisms for Thermal Power Generation Enterprises with Conflicting Tasks: Electricity Production versus Carbon Emission Reduction," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-22, July.
17. Matthias Kräkel, 2016. "Human Capital Investment and Work Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 627-651, September.
18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction?," MPRA Paper 116220, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction?," CEPR Discussion Papers 17885, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
19. Jiancai Pi, 2021. "An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(1), pages 128-137, January.
20. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 18208, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 117742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
21. Kräkel, Matthias, 2021. "On the delegation of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 965-981.
22. Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2015. "Rater Bias and Incentive Provision," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 833-862, October.
23. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2014. "Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 02/2014, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
24. Huseyin Gurkan & Francis de Véricourt, 2020. "Contracting, pricing, and data collection under the AI flywheel effect," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-20-01_R3, ESMT European School of Management and Technology, revised 17 Aug 2021.
25. Pi, Jiancai, 2014. "Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 274-277.
26. Huseyin Gurkan & Francis de Véricourt, 2022. "Contracting, Pricing, and Data Collection Under the AI Flywheel Effect," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 8791-8808, December.