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Fault Tolerant Implementation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Cabrales, Antonio & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 360-374.
  2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2009. "Implementation and Mind Control," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-673, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  3. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1015-1036, November.
  4. Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden, 2022. "Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus," Papers 2206.10065, arXiv.org.
  5. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments," MPRA Paper 48294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2007. "Fault Tolerant Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies," MPRA Paper 67353, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Nov 2007.
  7. Alexander L. Brown & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2019. "Empirical bias and efficiency of alpha-auctions: experimental evidence," Papers 1905.03876, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
  8. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2021. "A network solution to robust implementation: The case of identical but unknown distributions," Economics Working Papers 1776, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  9. Joseph Abadi & Markus Brunnermeier, 2018. "Blockchain Economics," NBER Working Papers 25407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Babaioff, Moshe & Kleinberg, Robert & Papadimitriou, Christos H., 2009. "Congestion games with malicious players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 22-35, September.
  11. Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid, 2015. "Complexity and repeated implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 259-292.
  12. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Mechanism Design," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 2, pages 49-96, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  13. Bartling, Björn & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "An externality-robust auction: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 186-204.
  14. T. Hayashi & R. Jain & V. Korpela & M. Lombardi, 2023. "Behavioral strong implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1257-1287, November.
  15. Antonio Cabrales & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Implemetation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics," Working Papers wp2007_0708, CEMFI.
  16. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2014. "Complex Questionnaires," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1529-1541, July.
  17. Laslier, Jean-François & Weibull, Jörgen, 2008. "Commitee decisions: optimality and equilibrium," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 692, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 11 Mar 2008.
  18. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2013. "Process manipulation in unique implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 883-893, October.
  19. Michele Lombardi & Yoshihara Naoki, 2014. "Natural implementation with partially-honest agents in economic environments with free-disposal," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2014-09, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  20. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Saran, Rene, 2011. "Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1712-1720, July.
  22. Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
  23. Michael Mandler, 2014. "IRRATIONALITY‐PROOFNESS: MARKETS VERSUS GAMES(forthcoming in the International Economic Review)," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 443-458, May.
  24. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  25. Matjaž Steinbacher & Mitja Steinbacher, 2019. "Opinion Formation with Imperfect Agents as an Evolutionary Process," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 53(2), pages 479-505, February.
  26. Sylvain Chassang, 2013. "Calibrated Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(5), pages 1935-1971, September.
  27. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory ( The further revision was subsequently published in "Economics Letters". )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-112, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  28. Kneeland, Terri, 2022. "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  29. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2012. "A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(6), pages 1057-1082.
  30. Duk Gyoo Kim & Daehong Min & John Wooders, 2022. "Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 9913, CESifo.
  31. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  32. Saran, R.R.S., 2008. "The maximal domain for the revelation principle when preferences are menu dependent," Research Memorandum 023, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  33. Saran, Rene, 2016. "Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 517-564.
  34. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
  35. Altun, Ozan Altuğ & Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Implementation with a sympathizer," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 36-49.
  36. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2008. "Implementation and Social Influence," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-598, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  37. Jianxin Yi, 2021. "Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 279-288, September.
  38. Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2012. "National implementation with partially honest agents," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  39. Deepanshu Vasal & Randall Berry, 2020. "Fault Tolerant Equilibria in Anonymous Games: best response correspondences and fixed points," Papers 2005.06812, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  40. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
  41. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-254, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  42. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-015(2004) )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-062, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  43. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems ( Revised as CARF-F-062(2006) )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-015, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  44. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2014. "Behavioral Implementation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 2975-3002, October.
  45. Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013. "To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 138-152.
  46. Rodrigo A. Velez & Alexander L. Brown, 2019. "Empirical strategy-proofness," Papers 1907.12408, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
  47. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
  48. Gavan, Malachy James & Penta, Antonio, 2022. "Safe Implementation," TSE Working Papers 22-1369, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  49. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via transfers with identical but unknown distributions," Economics Working Papers 1676, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  50. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud, 2024. "Beyond dominance and Nash: Ranking equilibria by critical mass," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 378-394.
  51. Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler, 2018. "The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Mar 2018.
  52. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2014. "Fault tolerance in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 438-457.
  53. Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
  54. Malachy James Gavan & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Safe Implementation," Working Papers 1363, Barcelona School of Economics.
  55. George F. N. Shoukry, 2019. "Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 497-526, March.
  56. Rodrigo A. Velez & Alexander L. Brown, 2018. "Empirical Equilibrium," Papers 1804.07986, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
  57. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-304, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  58. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  59. Joseph Y. Halpern, 2007. "Computer Science and Game Theory: A Brief Survey," Papers cs/0703148, arXiv.org.
  60. Rivas, Javier, 2015. "Mechanism design and bounded rationality: The case of type misreporting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 6-13.
  61. Kneeland, Terri, 2017. "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-303, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  62. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2007. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation ( Revised version of CARF-F-062(2006); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a short article. )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-109, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  63. Savva, Foivos, 2018. "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 27-34.
  64. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2007. "Fault Tolerant Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies," MPRA Paper 67392, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Nov 2007.
  65. Barlo, Mehmet & Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün, 2023. "Behavioral implementation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
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