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Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Miller, Luis & Montero, Maria & Vanberg, Christoph, 2018. "Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 60-92.
  2. Nunnari, Salvatore, 2021. "Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 186-230.
  3. Baron, David P. & Bowen, T. Renee & Nunnari, Salvatore, 2017. "Durable coalitions and communication: Public versus private negotiations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 1-13.
  4. Tremewan, James & Vanberg, Christoph, 2018. "Voting rules in multilateral bargaining: using an experiment to relax procedural assumptions," Working Papers 0651, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  5. Pohan Fong, 2008. "Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power," Discussion Papers 1465, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Mallucci, Paola & Wu, Diana Yan & Cui, Tony Haitao, 2019. "Social motives in bilateral bargaining games: How power changes perceptions of fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 138-152.
  7. Buchanan, Joy A. & Roberts, Gavin, 2022. "Other people’s money: Preferences for equality in groups," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  8. Guillaume Fréchette & John Kagel & Massimo Morelli, 2012. "Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 779-800, April.
  9. Nunnari, Salvatore & Zapal, Jan, 2016. "Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 275-294.
  10. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416.
  11. Andrzej Baranski & Rebecca Morton, 2022. "The determinants of multilateral bargaining: a comprehensive analysis of Baron and Ferejohn majoritarian bargaining experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(4), pages 1079-1108, September.
  12. Maaser, Nicola & Paetzel, Fabian & Traub, Stefan, 2019. "Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 433-450.
  13. Andrzej Baranski & D.J. da Cunha Batista Geraldes & Ada Kovaliukaite & James Tremewan, 2021. "Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining," Working Papers 2102, Utrecht School of Economics.
  14. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2020. "Why should majority voting be unfair?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 281-295.
  15. Anita Gantner & Kristian Horn & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2013. "Fair Division in Unanimity Bargaining with Subjective Claims," Working Papers 2013-31, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
  16. Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2012. "Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 908-909, November.
  17. Regine Oexl & Anita Gantner, 2021. "Respecting Entitlements in Legislative Bargaining - A Matter of Preference or Necessity?," Working Papers 2021-25, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
  18. Luis Miller & Christoph Vanberg, 2013. "Decision costs in legislative bargaining: an experimental analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 373-394, June.
  19. Marco Battaglini & Thomas Palfrey, 2012. "The dynamics of distributive politics," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 739-777, April.
  20. Hsu, Li-Chen & Yang, C.C. & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2008. "Positive- versus zero-sum majoritarian ultimatum games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 498-510, December.
  21. Sauermann, Jan & Beckmann, Paul, 2019. "The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 90-102.
  22. Li-Chen Hsu & Kamhon Kan & C.C. Yang & Chun-Lei Yang, 2015. "An Experimental Study on Dividing Gains through Politics," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 62(5), pages 546-566, November.
  23. Andrzej Baranski & Diogo Geraldes & Ada Kovaliukaite & James Tremewan, 2024. "An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(10), pages 6622-6636, October.
  24. Demiral, Elif E. & Mollerstrom, Johanna, 2020. "The entitlement effect in the ultimatum game – does it even exist?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 341-352.
  25. Kai A. Konrad & Raisa Sherif, 2019. "Sanctioning, selection, and pivotality in voting: theory and experimental results," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 330-357, September.
  26. Merkel, Anna & Vanberg, Christoph, 2023. "Multilateral bargaining with subjective claims under majority vs. unanimity rule: An experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
  27. Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2011. "Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 947-985.
  28. Gary Bolton & Jeannette Brosig-Koch, 2012. "How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 623-649, August.
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