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Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory
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Cited by:
- Herweg, Fabian & Schwarz, Marco A., 2016.
"Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
11179, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fabian Herweg & Marco A. Schwarz, 2016. "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5838, CESifo.
- Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009.
"Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September.
- Jean Hindriks & Ben Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," Working Papers 2006-02, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
- HINDRIKS, Jean & LOCKWOOD, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean Hindriks & Benjamin Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 1509, CESifo.
- Jean, HINDRIKS & Ben, Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation and Vote Welfare," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Mar 2005.
- Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," Economic Research Papers 269623, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Lockwood, Ben & Hindricks, Jean, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 5125, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014.
"Delegation and dynamic incentives,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
- Strausz, Roland & Shin, Dongsoo, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 9929, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 4774, CESifo.
- Emanuele Gerratana & Levent Kockesen, 2012. "Renegotiation-Proof Third-Party Contracts under Asymmetric Information," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1208, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Jonathan Treussard, 2005. "Life-Cycle Consumption Plans and Portfolio Policies in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton Economy," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-033, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2016.
"Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 115-143, June.
- Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2016. "Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate," Post-Print hal-02638008, HAL.
- Gerratana Emanuele & Koçkesen Levent, 2012.
"Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49, July.
- Levent Kockesen & Emanuele Gerratana, 2009. "Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 0908, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017.
"A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2013. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Working Papers E1304E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01509602, HAL.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2014. "A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement," MPRA Paper 53504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Post-Print halshs-01509602, HAL.
- Levent Koçkesen & Emanuele Gerratana, 2008. "Delegation with Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 0803., Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Fabian Herweg & Marco A. Schwarz, 2018.
"Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1995-2021, November.
- Herweg, Fabian & Schwarz, Marco A., 2017. "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 56, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Emanuele Gerratana & Levent Koçkesen, 2015.
"Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(3), pages 173-209, September.
- Emanuele Gerratana & Levent Koçkesen, 2013. "Commitment without Reputation: Renegotiation-Proof Contracts under Asymmetric Information," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1323, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2023.
"Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 256-290, March.
- Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2018. "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 105, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2022. "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 356, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2002.
"A theoretical foundation of the Porter hypothesis,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 355-360, May.
- Stefan Ambec & Philippe Barla, 2001. "A Theoretical Foundation of the Porter Hypothesis," CSEF Working Papers 54, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2000.
"Organizational Design of R & D Activities,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0190, Econometric Society.
- Ambec, S. & Poitevin, M., 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D Activities," Cahiers de recherche 2001-12, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D Activities," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-38, CIRANO.
- AMBEC, Stefan & POITEVIN, Michel, 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D Activities," Cahiers de recherche 2001-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D activities," CSEF Working Papers 60, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Incentives and management styles," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 22-31.
- Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2008.
"Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design,"
Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers
275717, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Zvika Neeman & Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20101, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275726, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- AMBEC Stefan & POITEVIN Michel, 2008. "Marketing vs Engineering: Who Should Decide ?," LERNA Working Papers 08.22.266, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Saltuk Ozerturk, 2006. "Financial innovations and managerial incentive contracting," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(2), pages 434-454, May.
- Theilen Bernd, 2008. "Lobbying and Contract Delegation in Public Procurement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-35, September.
- Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2013. "Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 473-501.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013.
"Contracts offered by bureaucrats,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 686-711, December.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013. "Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 4511, CESifo.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree, 2013. "Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats," Working Papers UWEC-2013-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Buzard, Kristy & ,, 2012.
"Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
- Buzard, Kristy & Watson, Joel, 2010. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3df3q4vg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2009. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: General Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3923q7kz, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Michel Poitevin, 1995.
"Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design,"
Discussion Papers
1135, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-03, CIRANO.
- Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, September.
- William E. Spangler & James M. Peters, 2000. "Management control of complex, mission‐critical processes," Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(3), pages 175-193, September.
- Dilip Mookherjee, 2006.
"Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
- Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Decentralization, Hierarchies and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-034, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Sep 2005.
- Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2015. "Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1159-1187.
- Mostafa Beshkar, 2016.
"Arbitration and Renegotiation in Trade Agreements,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 586-619.
- Mostafa Beshkar, 2014. "Arbitration and Renegotiation in Trade Agreements," CAEPR Working Papers 2014-004, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Jeff S. Johnson & Ravipreet S. Sohi, 2016. "Understanding and resolving major contractual breaches in buyer–seller relationships: a grounded theory approach," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 185-205, March.
- Mostafa Beshkar, 2014. "Arbitration and Renegotiation in Trade Agreements," Caepr Working Papers 2014-004, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Ha Ta & Terry L. Esper & Kenneth Ford & Sebastian Garcia‐Dastuge, 2018. "Trustworthiness Change and Relationship Continuity after Contract Breach in Financial Supply Chains," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 54(4), pages 42-61, October.
- Théophile, AZOMAHOU & Raouf, BOUCEKKINE & Phu, NUYEN VAN, 2003. "Energy consumption, technological progress and economic policy," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2003025, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).