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An Optimal Tax/Subsidy for Output and Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information in Oligopoly Markets

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Manel Antelo, 2011. "Output taxation by a revenue-raising government under signaling," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2011/03, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  2. Takayoshi Shinkuma & Hajime Sugeta, 2022. "Trial runs as environmental policy with strategic firms," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 24(2), pages 285-303, April.
  3. Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, 2002. "Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 617-635, October.
  4. Halkos, George & Kitsou, Dimitra, 2014. "A weighted location differential tax method in environmental problems," MPRA Paper 59502, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Requate, Till, 2005. "Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Survey," Economics Working Papers 2005-12, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  6. Jihad C. Elnaboulsi & Wassim Daher & Yiğit Sağlam, 2023. "Environmental taxation, information precision, and information sharing," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(2), pages 301-341, April.
  7. Varawala, Lamia & Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza & Dán, György & Bunn, Derek & Rosellón, Juan, 2023. "A pricing mechanism to jointly mitigate market power and environmental externalities in electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
  8. Kim, Jae-Cheol & Lee, Sang-Ho, 1995. "An optimal regulation in an intertemporal oligopoly market: The Generalized Incremental Surplus Subsidy (GISS) scheme," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 225-249, September.
  9. Lappi, Pauli & Lintunen, Jussi, 2021. "From cradle to grave? On optimal nuclear waste disposal," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
  10. Prieger, James E. & Sanders, Nicholas J., 2012. "Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 410-426.
  11. Lassi Ahlvik & Matti Liski, 2019. "Think global, act local! A mechanism for global commons and mobile firms," CESifo Working Paper Series 7597, CESifo.
  12. Ross McKitrick, 1999. "A Cournot Mechanism for Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(3), pages 353-363, October.
  13. Garcia, Arturo & Leal, Mariel & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2018. "A new irrelevance result in an endogenous timing with a consumer-friendly public firm," MPRA Paper 85648, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Marcos, Félix, 2010. "Price regulation in oligopoly," UC3M Working papers. Economics we100101, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  15. Lappi, Pauli, 2020. "On optimal extraction under asymmetric information over reclamation costs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
  16. Marcos, Félix, 2011. "Price regulation in oligopolistic markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 13443, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  17. Shrestha, Ratna K., 2017. "Menus of price-quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-7.
  18. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Kelly, David L., 2014. "Dynamic regulation design without payments: The importance of timing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 169-180.
  19. Lee, Sang-Ho, 1996. "An optional permit system for global pollution control," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 79-84, January.
  20. Lassi Ahlvik & Matti Liski, 2022. "Global Externalities, Local Policies, and Firm Selection," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 1231-1275.
  21. Arguedas, Carmen & van Soest, Daan P., 2009. "On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 192-205, September.
  22. George E. Halkos & Dimitra C. Kitsou, 2018. "Weighted location differential tax in environmental problems," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 20(1), pages 1-15, January.
  23. Hokkanen, Topi, 2023. "Optimal carbon leakage," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 15/2023, Bank of Finland.
  24. Antelo, Manel & Loureiro, Maria L., 2009. "Asymmetric information, signaling and environmental taxes in oligopoly," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 1430-1440, March.
  25. Lee, Sang-Ho & Kim, Jae-Cheol, 1995. "Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 95-99, July.
  26. Lappi, Pauli, 2020. "A model of optimal extraction and site reclamation," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
  27. Paul Mensink, 2004. "Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric Information: The Differential Tax Revisited," Working Papers 2004.124, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  28. Berglann, Helge, 2012. "Implementing optimal taxes using tradable share permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 402-409.
  29. Manel Antelo, 2012. "A Revenue-raising Government Taxing a Firm with Private Information," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 203(4), pages 57-86, December.
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