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The informational advantage of specialized monitors: the case of bank examiners

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Cited by:

  1. Furfine, Craig, 2002. "The interbank market during a crisis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 809-820, May.
  2. Affinito, Massimiliano, 2012. "Do interbank customer relationships exist? And how did they function in the crisis? Learning from Italy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3163-3184.
  3. Charles W. Calomiris & Mark Carlson, 2022. "Bank Examiners’ Information and Expertise and their Role in Monitoring and Disciplining Banks Before and During the Panic of 1893," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(2-3), pages 381-423, March.
  4. Nguyen, Tu, 2013. "The disciplinary effect of subordinated debt on bank risk taking," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 117-141.
  5. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Using bank supervisory data to improve macroeconomic forecasts," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 21-32.
  6. DeYoung, Robert E. & Hughes, Joseph P. & Moon, Choon-Geol, 2001. "Efficient risk-taking and regulatory covenant enforcement in a deregulated banking industry," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 255-282.
  7. Lisa Barrow & Cecilia Elena Rouse, 2000. "Using market valuation to assess the importance and efficiency of public school spending," Working Paper Series WP-00-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  8. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000. "Subordinated debt and bank capital reform," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2000-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  9. Diana Hancock & Myron Kwast, 2001. "Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is it Feasible?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 147-187, October.
  10. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric S & Tootell, Geoffrey M B, 2003. "Identifying the Macroeconomic Effect of Loan Supply Shocks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(6), pages 931-946, December.
  11. Mark Flannery, 2001. "The Faces of “Market Discipline”," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 107-119, October.
  12. Ashcraft, Adam B., 2008. "Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from regulatory capital mix," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 543-561, October.
  13. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.
  14. Joel Shapiro & David Skeie, 2015. "Information Management in Banking Crises," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(8), pages 2322-2363.
  15. Philip Swicegood & Jeffrey A. Clark, 2001. "Off‐site monitoring systems for predicting bank underperformance: a comparison of neural networks, discriminant analysis, and professional human judgment," Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(3), pages 169-186, September.
  16. anonymous, 1999. "Using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline," Staff Studies 172, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  17. John S. Jordan & Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, 1999. "Impact of greater bank disclosure amidst a banking crisis," Working Papers 99-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  18. Catharine Lemieux, 2003. "Network vulnerabilities and risks in the retail payment system," Emerging Issues, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  19. Delis, Manthos & Kim, Suk-Joong & Politsidis, Panagiotis & Wu, Eliza, 2020. "Regulators vs. markets: Do differences in their bank risk perceptions affect lending terms?," MPRA Paper 98548, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. J. Caprio & P. Honohan, 2000. "Restoring Banking Stability: Beyond Supervised Capital Requirements," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 68(1), pages 5-22, March.
  21. Bednarek, Peter & Dinger, Valeriya & Schultz, Alison & von Westernhagen, Natalja, 2023. "Banks of a feather: The informational advantage of being alike," Discussion Papers 09/2023, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  22. Furfine, Craig H, 2001. "Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the Overnight Federal Funds Market," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(1), pages 33-57, January.
  23. anonymous, 2000. "Improving public disclosure in banking," Staff Studies 173, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  24. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Market discipline in the governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: monitoring vs. influencing," Working Paper Series WP-00-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  25. Evanoff, Douglas D. & Wall, Larry D., 2002. "Measures of the riskiness of banking organizations: Subordinated debt yields, risk-based capital, and examination ratings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 989-1009, May.
  26. Francesco Palazzo, 2016. "Peer monitoring via loss mutualization," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1088, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  27. Caprio,Gerard & Honohan, Patrick, 1999. "Beyond capital ideals : restoring banking stability," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2235, The World Bank.
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